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Regulating Resort to Force: 




Much of  the international legal debate about regulating force and self-defence takes place on 
a substantive axis, focusing on the scope of  force prohibitions and exceptions. This article 
instead focuses on their doctrinal form, or modes of  argumentation and analysis through 
which facts are assessed in relation to legal directives, to illuminate how many of  the assump-
tions about substantive policy goals and risks tend to be coupled with other assumptions 
about the way international law operates in this field. It shows that the flexible, adaptable 
standards favoured by some states, scholars, and other international actors and the fixed 
rules and processes favoured by others reflect not only competing assessments of  threats and 
the policy utility of  force wielded beyond the Security Council’s authorization, but also differ-
ent sets of  interlocking, foundational assumptions about international law and the conditions 
for its effectiveness. These include differences over how legal-doctrinal form relates to exter-
nal enforcement pressures and how it generates compliance pull within states. This article 
shows that exposing and prising apart some assumptions underlying doctrinal orientations 
– assumptions that are usually obscured or overshadowed when debates are framed in terms 
of  substantive permissiveness versus stringency – opens and clarifies options for reforming 
the legal regime regulating force, and it proposes avenues of  further analysis of  doctrinal form 
in this area.
1 Introduction
The United Nations (UN) Charter generally prohibits the use or threat of  force except 
pursuant to UN Security Council authorization or in self-defence to armed attacks. It 
is widely agreed that contemporary threats – such as weapons of  mass destruction 
(WMD) proliferation, non-state terrorism, and large-scale human rights atrocities 
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– pose challenges for the UN Charter regime, but it is hotly contested how the law 
should be interpreted to meet them.
Much of  the legal debate – among states, scholars, and other international actors 
– takes place on a substantive axis, focusing on the scope of  force prohibitions and 
exceptions. Are exceptions to the prohibition on force too tightly drawn or too loosely 
drawn? Is the UN Charter regime too strict or too permissive to meet new security 
challenges? Is the Security Council’s collective security decision-making capable of  
dealing with contemporary threats and, if  not, is greater authority for unilateralism 
the answer or is that an even greater threat? Such substantive policy debate tends to 
dominate discussion.
This article looks at the problem differently. It concentrates less on the substantive 
policy content of  the legal prohibitions and exceptions than on their doctrinal form, by 
which I mean modes of  argumentation and analysis through which facts are assessed 
in relation to legal directives, and it draws on some of  the theory and conceptual cate-
gorization of  doctrinal form in scholarship so common to other areas of  law. Focusing 
on doctrinal form illuminates how many of  the assumptions about substantive policy 
goals and risks tend to be coupled with other assumptions about the way international 
law operates in this field, and it surfaces questions of  whether the structure of  legal 
argumentation in this area merely masks substantive policy agendas or can help in 
constraining or shaping them.
Within the legal discourse of  states, scholars, and other actors in the international 
system two main orientations emerge with respect to how legal argument and jus-
tification of  resort to force outside the UN Security Council should be structured. 
Adherents to one orientation, whom I term ‘Bright-Liners’, favour governing states’ 
legal authority to use force unilaterally1 by clear and rigid rules that admit little case 
by case discretion. Adherents to another orientation, whom I term ‘Balancers’, argue 
that the legality of  unilateral resort to force should be judged by objective but flex-
ible standards that call for weighing contextual factors, thereby vesting in states some 
discretion to account for competing values. To take a very timely example as of  this 
writing, if  Israel were to take military action against Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons 
programme sites, should that action be judged in relation to a set of  fairly fixed points, 
such as whether Iran is on the immediate verge of  attacking Israel (Bright-Liners), 
or in relation to a standard of  reasonableness, further defined in terms of  context-
sensitive factors like necessity and proportionality (Balancers)?
As explained further below, by ‘flexible’ standards and ‘discretion’ associated with 
Balancers I do not mean an understanding of  law as any less binding than that envisioned 
by Bright-Liners. I mean a legal-doctrinal method that requires appraisal of  complex 
situations in light of  principles and criteria, rather than sharp lines. Put another way, 
it is not to suggest a balancing of  legality versus other imperatives, but to suggest that 
interpreting legal boundaries in a specific case sometimes requires internal balancing 
of  contextual variables and competing principles.
1 I use the term ‘unilaterally’ here not in the sense of  states acting on their own, rather than as part of  a 
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This is also not to suggest that Bright-Liners’ and Balancers’ respective preferences 
for rigid rules versus elastic standards reflect a universal or abstract normative com-
mitment to one particular doctrinal mode or formula. Quite the contrary; framing 
the issue in these terms exposes something of  puzzle, insofar as when it comes to the 
UN Security Council’s authority, the doctrinal preferences associated with these ori-
entations invert: in that context, Bright-Liners are usually quite comfortable with dis-
cretion bounded by flexible standards and Balancers are distrustful of  how it will be 
exercised. As to states’ authority to use force beyond circumstances authorized by the 
Security Council, though, a conceptual cleavage over form emerges with respect to 
regulating force that is quite consistent across different types of  threats.
By dissecting the debate between Bright-Liners and Balancers into its component 
parts, this article argues that beneath the exterior of  substantive disagreements about 
the proper content and form of  the UN Charter regime also lie deep divisions about the 
very nature of  international law in this area and conditions for its effectiveness. It is 
not to defend one orientation or the other,2 but instead to map the critical assumptions 
of  each in order better to understand some ways in which legal-doctrinal form matters 
with regard to regulating force and to explore the normative implications and stakes 
of  this debate.
Institutional setting is critical to this analysis. Legal regulation of  resort to force is 
largely decentralized, relying heavily on individual states and, increasingly, non-state 
actors (including non-governmental and supranational organizations) for applica-
tion and enforcement. Sometimes the UN Security Council formally adjudicates on 
the legality of  force, either authorizing it or condemning it, and therefore providing 
centralized and authoritative appraisal. And occasionally other formal UN organs or 
international organizations opine on the legality of  force. For the most part, however, 
application and enforcement of  international law are decentralized, occur outside 
formal international institutions, and remain largely the province of  states. Legal 
scholars and political scientists have recently turned their attention to the interac-
tion between the substance, structure, and institutional context of  international law,3 
and this article seeks to illuminate those relationships specifically with respect to use 
of force.
Power politics is also integral to these debates, and this analysis is therefore part 
of  a larger conversation about whether legal method and politics can ever really be 
prised apart. It is no accident that the United States and those who view its military 
might favourably – whether in terms of  advancing narrow state interests or promot-
ing global order and justice – tend to be Balancers; those who worry about such power 
and seek to constrain it (or who fear being targets of  it) tend to be Bright-Liners. That 
2 To be clear about my own biases, I have argued previously in favour of  balancing: see M.C. Waxman, 
Intervention To Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities: International Norms and U.S. Policy (2009) (advocating 
the possibility of  legal intervention to stop mass atrocities without UN SC authorization); Waxman, ‘The 
Use of  Force Against States that Might Have Weapons of  Mass Destruction’, 31 Michigan J Int’l L (2009) 
1 (advocating an objective reasonableness approach to precautionary self-defence against WMD threats).
3 See Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of  Legalization’, 54 Int’l Org (2000) 401, at 413–414; Raustiala, ‘Form 
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is not simply because, as some might assume, bright lines are inherently stricter or 
more binding than flexible standards, though. They are not. This article helps one bet-
ter to understand the relationship between power politics and doctrinal form,4 while 
in doing so it also shows that form is independently significant.
To be clear, there are many ways to slice analytically the major debates about jus 
ad bellum and the UN Charter regime, and I am not arguing that the choice of  doc-
trinal form is the best or most important. The Bright-Liner-versus-Balancer debate 
correlates closely with other divides: restrictive-versus-permissive limits on force, 
collectivism-versus-sovereigntism/unilateralism, idealism-versus-realism. My point 
is that parsing debates in terms of  doctrinal form highlights some additional work 
that proponents believe legal clarity and rigidity or contextualized legal flexibility can 
do – work that is often obscured by those more common analytical frames. If  choices 
about doctrinal form matter in ways asserted by participants in this jus ad bellum sub-
debate, then this analysis helps in understanding how legal argumentation may shape 
international actors’ behaviour and in assessing options for legal reform. Even if  one 
remains unpersuaded that doctrinal form matters, then this analysis exposes how pro-
ponents of  competing legal viewpoints use arguments about doctrinal structure to 
promote their ideological or policy agendas.
Section 2 catalogues debates between Bright-Liners and Balancers in three highly 
contested doctrinal areas related to force: anticipatory self-defence against WMD 
threats, humanitarian intervention to stop mass atrocities, and resort to force against 
non-state terrorist actors. Section 3 relates doctrinal form to substance, showing that 
the flexible, adaptable standards favoured by Balancers and fixed rules and processes 
favoured by Bright-Liners reflect competing assessments of  threats and the policy util-
ity of  force wielded beyond the Security Council’s authorization – competing policy 
judgements that have tended to dominate debate. This analysis depends heavily on 
institutional setting, so the debate about doctrinal form and use of  force is very differ-
ent from seemingly similar debates about bright-line rules versus elastic standards in 
domestic law settings.
Section 4 shows that Bright-Liners’ emphasis on clear rules and processes and 
Balancers’ emphasis on flexible standards reflect different sets of  interlocking, foun-
dational assumptions about international law and the conditions for its effectiveness. 
These include differences over how legal form relates to external enforcement pres-
sures and how it generates compliance pull within states.
With those differences in mind, section 5 looks forward and considers the norma-
tive implications of  these insights. It argues that exposing and pulling apart some 
assumptions underlying Bright-Liners’ and Balancers’ orientations – assumptions 
that are usually obscured or overshadowed when legal debates are framed in terms of  
substantive permissiveness or stringency – opens or clarifies options for reforming the 
legal regime regulating force, and this section proposes avenues of  further analysis of  
4 Cf. Corten, ‘The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of  Force: A Methodological 
Debate’, 16 EJIL (2005) 803 (showing that doctrinal analysis of  uses of  force reflects methodological 
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doctrinal form – or reform – in this area. Because institutional setting so powerfully 
drives debate between Bright-liners and Balancers, this section concludes by predict-
ing that evolution of  that setting will in turn shape future debate about doctrinal form.
2 Regulating Resort to Force: Contemporary Debates
The UN Charter prohibits ‘the threat or use of  force’,5 but it expressly recognizes two 
sets of  circumstances in which force is permitted. Firstly, Chapter VII directs that the 
UN Security Council shall have authority to authorize measures, including the use of  
force, to protect peace and security.6 Secondly, Article 51 states that ‘[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of  individual or collective self-defense 
if  an armed attack occurs’.7 Debates about the meaning of  these provisions often 
include preferences about doctrinal form.
A Bright-Liners Versus Balancers
Since the Charter’s founding, questions have abounded as to the scope of  the self-
defence exception and whether other grounds besides armed attacks might justify 
resort to force.8 During the Cold War, international legal discourse about force was 
almost entirely refracted through superpower rivalries, while collective security 
administered through the UN Security Council was impossible due to East–West enmi-
ties and suspicions of  unilateralism were largely subordinated to broader geostrategic 
agendas.9 Since the UN Security Council’s liberation from Cold War paralysis, most 
contemporary legal debates about resort to force beyond UN Security Council autho-
rization – that is, as an exception to the presumptive default of  collective Charter rem-
edies – include preferences for rigid, codified rules (advocated by Bright-Liners) versus 
context-adaptive standards (advocated by Balancers).
Institutional setting is crucial to this debate. To a great degree, application and 
enforcement of  international law regarding resort to force is decentralized, occurs 
outside formal international institutions, and remains largely the province of  
states.10
Arguably, the UN Charter and its drafters originally envisaged much greater cen-
tralization and formalization. The self-defence provisions of  Article 51 could be 
read to grant a temporary right of  self-defensive action until the Security Council 
 5 UN Charter, Art. 2(4), reads: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of  force against the territorial integrity or political independence of  any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of  the United Nations.’
 6 UN Charter, Arts. 39, 42.
 7 UN Charter, Art. 51.
 8 See Schachter, ‘The Right of  States to Use Armed Force’, 82 Michigan L Rev (1984) 1620, at 1624.
 9 See Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of  the Collective Authority of  the Security Council’, 78 AJIL (1993) 552, at 
553.
10 See T.M. Franck, Recourse to Force (2002), at 6–7; Schachter, ‘In Defense of  International Rules on the Use 
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intervenes,11 and Article 43 seemed to envisage that states would make available to 
the Security Council significant stand-by military capabilities to fulfil its peace and 
security duties.12 This vision went unfulfilled, and during most of  the Cold War, East–
West rivalries and profligate use of  vetoes neutralized the Security Council’s collective 
decision-making system.13
From the 1990s onward, the UN Security Council has either authorized or con-
demned force in a wide range of  situations,14 thereby providing centralized and 
authoritative appraisal respected by Bright-Liners and Balancers alike – and breath-
ing new life into normative visions of  the Charter regime with a strong collective secu-
rity component. Such centralized decisions authorizing, disapproving, or condemning 
force are still infrequent, though, relative to the frequency of  security crises and mili-
tary engagements or threats, and they effectively exclude judgements against all of  the 
five veto-wielding permanent members.15
On rare occasions other UN organs, in particular the General Assembly or the 
International Court of  Justice (ICJ), or regional organizations opine on the legality 
of  force, though their authoritative force is limited (in the General Assembly’s case 
because its Charter mandate does not confer substantial responsibility; in the ICJ’s 
case because its decisions are advisory or are generally not considered universally 
binding; and in regional organizations’ case because the UN Charter subordinates 
their authority to the Security Council).16 States parties to the Rome Statute of  the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) recently decided to consider operationalizing that 
tribunal’s jurisdiction over crimes of  ‘aggression’, though it remains unclear when, if  
ever, this will occur and any such jurisdiction would be highly circumscribed.17
For the most part, then, law regarding resort to force is applied and enforced outside 
formal international adjudicative mechanisms, through appraisal by individual states 
and, to some extent, non-governmental and international organizations that wield 
informal influence in shaping expectations and opinion among domestic and interna-
tional audiences. Two major orientations with regard to doctrinal form emerge within 
this institutional context.
The Bright-Liner approach finds expression among many states18 and influential, 
contemporary international law scholars,19 as well as in some recent decisions of  the 
11 Art. 51 reads: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of  individual or collective 
self-defence if  an armed attack occurs against a Member of  the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’ (emphasis added).
12 Art. 43(1) states: ‘All Members of  the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of  inter-
national peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call … armed 
forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of  passage, necessary for the purpose of  maintaining 
international peace and security.’
13 See Franck, ‘Collective Security and UN Reform: Between the Necessary and the Possible’, 6 Chicago J Int’l 
L (2006) 597, at 601.
14 See Caron, supra note 9, at 553.
15 See Murphy, ‘Protean Jus Ad Bellum’, 27 Berkeley J Int’l L (2009) 22, at 37–38.
16 See ibid., at 47–49.
17 See Crook, ‘U.S. Delegation Active in ICC Negotiations to Define Crime of  Aggression’, 104 AJIL (2010) 511.
18 See C. Gray, International Law and the Use of  Force (3rd edn, 2008), at 118.
19 See infra sect. 2B and accompanying text for examples of  such academic viewpoints; see also Y. Dinstein, 
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ICJ and the report of  the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.20 
While giving broad discretion to the UN Security Council – a process that although 
internally quite unconstrained can yield clear directives – Bright-Liners generally 
argue that any use of  force beyond that authorized by the UN Security Council should 
be regulated by sharp lines, or rules that admit very little discretionary balancing by 
individual states (whether those contemplating or using force or those judging it).21
To Bright-Liners, the legality of  resort to force by individual states or groups of  states 
should operate as an on–off  switch, flipped by the manifestation of  readily identifiable 
factual preconditions, not shaded or uncertain assessments. Their preferred doctri-
nal formulas are ‘bright’ in several senses.22 First, authority to use force is triggered 
by specific and easily recognizable factual or procedural conditions (that is, either 
some pre-defined contingency occurs or the UN Security Council authorizes force). 
Secondly, the legality or illegality of  an action at any given time is quite clear and 
widely recognized and agreed upon among states and other international actors.23 
Even though the UN Security Council’s mandate is broad and substantively flexible, 
its outcomes – like satisfaction of  a rule – are externally bright in these respects: to 
states contemplating force or to actors judging the legality of  force, a Security Council 
vote is easily identified without resorting to weighing various factors and principles, 
and it is universally recognizable and authoritative. Those of  this orientation want 
authorized exceptions to Security Council approval, such as self-defence contemplated 
by Article 51, to be similarly bright – and therefore ‘subject to the discipline of  quick 
fact-checking by the rest of  the world’.24
Balancers, by contrast, view legality of  resort to force as more like a dimmer knob 
than an on–off  switch. This approach finds favour today among some powerful states 
(especially, but not limited to, the United States), whose practice and expressions of  
Art. 51 as a restrictive rule); Lobel, ‘American Hegemony and International Law: Benign Hegemony? 
Kosovo and Article 2(4) of  the U.N. Charter’, 1 Chicago J Int’l L (2000) 19, at 19 (‘The drafters of  the U.N. 
Charter attempted to create a bright-line rule limiting the use of  force’).
20 The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of  the High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, para. 190, UN Doc A/59/565 (2 Dec. 2004), available at: www.un.org/
secureworld/report.pdf  (hereinafter UN High-Level Panel).
21 See Kaye, ‘Adjudicating Self-Defense: Discretion, Perception, and the Resort to Force in International 
Law’, 44 Columbia J Transnat’l L (2005) 134, at 145–146 (discussing efforts by international lawyers 
to portray the UN Charter regime as a set of  clear rules). Bright-Liners’ differences with Balancers is 
reflected in the ICJ’s Oil Platforms judgment, in which it explained, ‘the United States claims that it con-
sidered in good faith that the attacks on the platforms were necessary to protect its essential security 
interests, and suggests that “A measure of  discretion should be afforded to a party’s good faith application 
of  measures to protect its essential security interests”’. The ICJ disagreed and went on to state that ‘the 
requirement of  international law that measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary 
for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no room for any “measure of  discretion”’: Oil Platforms 
(Iran v. US) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, at para. 73.
22 This is also not to suggest that Bright-Liners’ and Balancers’ respective preferences for rigid rules versus 
elastic standards reflect a universal or abstract normative commitment to one particular doctrinal mode 
or formula. Among scholars, e.g., adherents to these orientations usually do so in the context of  fuller 
theory of  law or international law in which the advantages of  bright-line rules or flexible standards are 
only one consideration and might be outweighed by others in any given context.
23 See Henkin, ‘Use of  Force: Law and U.S. Policy’, in L. Henkin et al. (eds), Right v. Might (1991), at 37, 62.
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opinio juris reflect this perspective,25 as well as some influential American scholars.26 
Objective reasonableness is the touchstone for Balancers.27 Although recognizing that 
UN Security Council authorization is always per se reasonable – indeed, they generally 
insist that it remains the preferred form of  legal authority for both strategic reasons 
and added legitimacy stemming from collective action – they believe additional, excep-
tional legal authority and discretion is needed, and they are sceptical that clear rules 
governing those exceptions are viable or desirable.
Instead, Balancers believe that use of  force beyond that authorized by the Security 
Council should be regulated by flexible standards that take account of  contextual 
factors and the various policy interests animating international law, and that this 
approach better reflects state practice.28 Abraham Sofaer argues, for example, that the 
United States and its allies should – and do – assess the legality of  force in terms of  rea-
sonableness, taking into account factors such as the magnitude of  the threat, its prob-
ability of  occurring, exhaustion of  peaceful alternatives, and consistency with the 
underlying purposes of  the UN Charter.29 Formulations like these are not ‘bright’ in 
either sense demanded by Bright-Liners: they require balancing of  value judgements 
rather than reliance on readily identifiable factual or procedural conditions, and they 
produce conclusions that may be highly contestable in good faith (e.g., Balancers dis-
agree among themselves about whether the 2003 Iraq war could be defended as rea-
sonable self-defence, especially in light of  differing assessments of  the likelihood that 
WMD threats from Iraq would materialize30).
To be clear, these two orientations – Bright-Liners and Balancers – actually rep-
resent segments along a spectrum of  possible views, rather than two discrete and 
dichotomous points, and they do not reflect a general normative commitment to one 
particular doctrinal mode across all areas of  law. As illustrated further in the next 
section, no one adopts the most extreme position of  absolute, rigid, and fixed rules or 
25 See Mathias, ‘The United States and the Security Council’, in N.  Blockker and N.  Schrijver (eds), The 
Security Council and the Use of  Force (2005), at 173, 187; Taft IV and Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and 
International Law’, 97 AJIL (2003) 557, at 557.
26 See infra sect. 2B and accompanying text for examples of  such academic viewpoints; see also Coll, ‘The 
Limits of  Global Consciousness and Legal Absolutism: Protecting International Law from some of  its Best 
Friends’, 27 Harvard Int’l LJ (1986) 599, at 608–609; Reisman, ‘Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of  
War’, 97 AJIL (2003) 82, at 82.
Among an earlier generation of  scholars, Julius Stone expressed scepticism about efforts to define 
aggression with bright-line rules, referring to such efforts as a mechanistic, ‘push-button’ approach: J. 
Stone, Aggression and World Order (1958), at 11–12. Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano agreed 
that the lawfulness of  coercion should turn on variable factors and policies that, depending on context, 
rationally bear upon state decision-making: M.S. McDougal and F.P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World 
Public Order (1961), at 151–153.
27 See McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 26, at 217 (calling for context-based reasonableness analysis in 
regulating resort to force).
28 See J. Brunnée and S.J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (2010), at 290.
29 Sofaer, ‘International Security and the Use of  Force’, in R.A. Miller and R.M. Bratspies (eds), Progress in 
International Law (2008), at 541.
30 Compare Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of  Pre-Emption’, 14 EJIL (2003) 209, at 224, with M. Doyle, Striking 
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exclusive reliance on flexible standards – in the end, each incorporates some elements 
of  the other’s preferred form. Bright-Liners ultimately admit some discretionary bal-
ancing in their analysis: even once a bright line of  self-defence is tripped, for example, 
states are bound by fluid necessity and proportionality standards. Balancers generally 
give great, even if  not dispositive, weight to satisfaction of  bright-line rules in their 
assessments, and they may ultimately desire to see refinement of  specific legal criteria 
to bring standards closer to bright-line rules.
Furthermore, there are important differences and subtle variations within each ori-
entation,31 as well as other doctrinal formulations and prominent accounts, including 
that doctrinal form is largely irrelevant altogether.32 Those coming from a viewpoint 
strongly rooted in realist international relations theory or in Critical Legal Studies, for 
example, might dismiss distinctions in doctrinal form as essentially immaterial, either 
because they believe neither meaningfully constrains state security policy or because 
either one is very linguistically and argumentatively malleable. The Bright-Liner and 
Balancer orientations represent, however, the most influential doctrinal form view-
points among those who take international legal regulation of  force seriously, and the 
following examples illustrate how the two idealized orientations compete across sev-
eral major international legal disputes about resort to force and contemporary secu-
rity threats.
B Contemporary Debates
Disagreements between Bright-Liners and Balancers have manifested themselves 
recently in many strands of  doctrine regarding resort to force. Both agree that WMD 
proliferation, large-scale and brutal deprivations of  human rights, and powerful non-
state actors pose challenges for a UN Charter regime designed with conventional, 
interstate military threats in mind. They disagree not only about appropriate bound-
aries for responding to these types of  threats with force but how those boundaries 
should be articulated and assessed doctrinally.
1. Anticipatory Self-defence and WMD
As a textual matter, Article 51 of  the Charter reads as a bright-line rule: ‘[n]othing in 
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of  … self-defense if  an armed attack 
occurs’.33 An armed attack is often (though not always) an easily identifiable trigger 
31 Franck, e.g., sees the UN Charter as more adaptive than many other Bright-Liners do: see generally 
Franck, supra note 10. Some scholars’ preference of  form depends on the specific type of  force at issue. 
Harold Koh, e.g., has argued in favour of  bright-line rules with regard to self-defence but is sympathetic 
to flexible standards with regard to humanitarian intervention: see Koh, ‘Comment’, in Doyle, supra note 
30, at 101, 106–107.
32 See, e.g., M.J. Glennon, Limits of  Law, Prerogatives of  Power: Interventionism After Kosovo (2001) (arguing 
that international law in this area fails to constrain power politics); M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to 
Utopia (2nd edn, 2005), at 590–595 (critiquing international legal doctrine and argumentation in this 
area as manipulable).
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that should, at least in theory, eliminate uncertainty as to its application in specific 
circumstances.34
It is widely agreed, however, that resort to force is also permitted in anticipation 
of  an imminent attack – a formula in which imminence derives from the principle of  
necessity. The classic formulation drawn from US Secretary of  State Daniel Webster’s 
1830s exchange with his British counterparts over The Caroline incident holds that 
resort to force is permitted without waiting to suffer a first blow, so long as a threat is 
‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of  means, and no moment for delibera-
tion’.35 In recent years, the strict anticipatory self-defence formula has come under 
strain in light of  WMD proliferation, especially nuclear arsenals.
Historically, conventional military threats often manifested themselves with vis-
ible signals of  enemy mobilization, giving threatened states some time to take forceful 
action in advance. By contrast, WMD threats, especially nuclear ones, pose a different 
array of  dangers. These include very low-probability but very high-magnitude dangers 
of  an aggressive strike, as well as the very high-probability but difficult to measure risk 
of  their implicitly threatened use, which may allow states possessing them more aggres-
sively to wield other forms of  violence and coercion such as terrorism.36 Both dangers 
pose significant threats to other states, but neither need be accompanied by visible sig-
nals of  mobilization, providing a last clear opportunity window to respond. Combined 
with these weapons’ catastrophic potential and the limits of  protective means after 
an attack has commenced, that feature of  some WMD arsenals severely restricts the 
opportunities for self-defence afforded by the traditional concept of  imminence. How, 
if  at all, should international law adjust in regulating anticipatory self-defensive force?
Bright-Liners argue for retaining the strict temporal imminence requirement, which 
one might point out involves some weighing of  contextual factors but is still relatively 
clear-cut.37 A strict imminence requirement, they argue, not only filters out cases in 
which self-defensive force is unnecessary but it avoids the need to weigh competing 
imperatives (including each state’s right to remain free from threat or attack), and it 
is susceptible to relatively straightforward factual determination ex ante and adjudica-
tion ex post.38 Unless a military threat – even a nuclear one – is temporally specific and 
34 See Weiner, ‘The Use of  Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills?’, 59 Stanford 
L Rev (2006) 415 (arguing that the UN Charter was drafted specifically to replace state discretion based 
on flexible standards with bright line rules); see also Glennon, ‘The Fog of  Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, 
and Incoherence in Article 51 of  the United Nations Charter’, 25 Harvard J L & Public Policy (2002) 539, 
at 546 (‘Drawing the line at the precise point of  an armed attack, an event the occurrence of  which could 
be objectively established, served the purpose of  eliminating uncertainty’).
35 Letter from Daniel Webster, US Sec’y of  State, to Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (6 Aug. 1842), 
quoted in J.B. Moore, A Digest of  International Law (1906), ii, s. 217, at 412.
36 See Waxman, supra note 2, at 9–10.
37 See, e.g., Lobel, ‘Preventive War and the Lessons of  History’, 68 U Pittsburg L Rev (2006) 307, at 312; 
Joyner, ‘Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of  WMD Proliferation’, 40 George Washington Int’l L Rev (2008) 233, at 
256 (‘The strength of  Article 51 as currently textually constructed is its clarity, in establishing a “bright 
line” rule for unilateral self-defense’); see also O. Corten, The Law Against War (trans. C. Sutcliffe, 2010), 
at 435–443 (denying the expansion of  the self-defence doctrine to deal with WMD threats).
38 See Gray, supra note 18, at 215 (arguing that widening the concept ‘deprives the requirement of  “immi-
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immediate, so discretion is tightly constrained, the Security Council should retain a 
monopoly of  legal resort to force.39
Balancers, on the other hand, argue that the legal requirement of  imminence must 
be replaced with more flexible standards40 or should be interpreted more elastically 
to account for the security context of  proliferated WMD.41 They seek to adapt use of  
force rules to the unique challenges of  WMD threats and proliferation, while main-
taining fidelity to the imminence requirement’s core purposes of  constraining the use 
of  force except when other options have been exhausted and when waiting poses an 
unacceptable risk that opportunities to eradicate the threat will close. Even if  continu-
ing to frame their self-defence inquiry in terms of  ‘imminence’, most Balancers would 
consider relevant at least such factors as the nature and magnitude of  threat in deter-
mining reasonableness.42
In sum, both Bright-Liners and Balancers recognize that WMD proliferation poses 
new security threats, but Bright-Liners seek to contain legal resort to force to nar-
row and readily-identifiable instances of  temporally imminent threats or UN Security 
993, at 1000 (explaining rationales behind imminence requirement as helping to ensure that force is 
only used as a last resort and to guard against false positives).
39 See UN High Level Panel, supra note 20, at paras 189–191; Franck, ‘The Power of  Legitimacy and the 
Legitimacy of  Power: International Law in an Age of  Power Disequilibrium’, 100 AJIL (2006) 88, at 
104; see also Henkin, ‘War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor’, 45 Santa Clara L Rev (2005) 817, at 825 
(arguing that ‘measures of  preventive, preemptive self-defense are not permitted under the U.N. Charter, 
however reasonable the fear – except if  authorized by the U.N. Security Council’).
40 See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 30, at 17–25; Feinstein and Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’, 83 Foreign Affairs 
(2004) 136.
41 See, e.g., Slocombe, ‘Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy’, 45 Survival (2003) 117, at 125; Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst, Chatham House, Principles of  International Law on the Use of  Force by States in Self-Defense 
(2005), at 9, available at: www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108106. Michael 
Reisman and Andrea Armstrong argue that this balancing view is more reflective of  contemporary 
practice among some major states than Bright-Liners usually credit: see Reisman and Armstrong, ‘The 
Past and Future of  the Claim of  Preemptive Self-Defense’, 100 AJIL (2006) 525, at 538–544. See also 
21 Apr. 2004, Parl. Deb., HL (2004) 370 (statement of  Lord Goldsmith, explaining the British govern-
ment’s position that ‘[t]he concept of  what constitutes an “imminent” armed attack will develop to meet 
new circumstances and new threats’), available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/
ldhansrd/vo040421/text/40421-07.htm; Tange, ‘Netherlands State Practice for the Parliamentary Year 
2004–2005’, [2006] Netherlands Yrbk Int’l L 233, at 328 (reporting the Dutch government’s view, agree-
ing with that of  the US government, that emerging threats including WMD and terrorism require the 
adjustment of  the concept of  imminence with respect to legal pre-emptive self-defence).
Many developing states take a very negative view of  expanded anticipatory self-defence doctrine. 
In 2004, the Organization of  the Islamic Conference, e.g., ‘condemned once again the principle of  pre-
emptive military strikes against any country under any pretext whatsoever’: Final Communiqué of  the 
Thirty-First Session of  the Islamic Conference of  Foreign Ministers, at para. 41 (16 June 2004), reprinted 
in UN Doc A/58/856-S/2004/582.
42 See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 30. As Christopher Greenwood puts it, in assessing imminence ‘it is neces-
sary to take into account … factors that did not exist at the time of  the Caroline incident’, including the 
quantum of  harm posed by WMD and the impossibility for a state ‘to afford its population any effective 
protection once the attack has been launched’: see Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Pre-emptive 
Use of  Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’, 4 San Diego Int’l LJ (2003) 7, at 16. Therefore, he con-
cludes, a WMD threat ‘can reasonably be treated as imminent in circumstances where an attack by con-
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Council-sanctioned action, whereas Balancers weigh contextual factors including the 
special characteristics of  WMD and their delivery mechanisms. Sometimes the insis-
tence by both Bright-Liners and some Balancers that the necessary condition remains 
‘imminence’ allows them to paper over differences at the surface, but one orientation 
views imminence as a fixed point while the other views it elastically to account for 
context.
2. Humanitarian Intervention
Human rights law sits in tension with strict notions of  state sovereignty, and the idea 
that the international community has an interest in how states treat their own people 
within their own borders raises questions as to whether military intervention to save 
populations from mass atrocities is ever legal. In recent decades it has become gener-
ally accepted – especially after UN-authorized interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, 
and, recently, Libya – that widespread atrocities occurring within states may pose 
threats to peace and security warranting Security Council action.43 Is that the only 
legal ground upon which armed humanitarian intervention may rest, in the absence 
of  a state’s consent?
Bright-Liners argue yes, that humanitarian intervention is prohibited absent UN 
Security Council authorization.44 ‘Under the UN Charter system … respect for human 
rights and self-determination of  peoples, however important and crucial it may be, is 
never allowed to put peace in jeopardy’, they generally argue.45 ‘One may like or dis-
like this state of  affairs, but so it is under lex lata.’46 This flat prohibition outside the UN 
Security Council operates as a bright-line rule, admitting no legal discretion otherwise 
on the part of  individual states to intervene to combat mass atrocities.47
Force: The Law As It Is and As It Should Be’, written evidence submitted to the UK Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2004, at para. 35, available at: www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/441/4060808.htm (‘it would in my view be appropriate to begin 
to think beyond imminence to reasonable foreseeability, ie, away from temporal notions of  threat and 
towards action required to neutralise the risk of  catastrophic harm’).
43 See G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (2008), at 134.
44 See Dinstein, supra note 19, at 85–86; A.  Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards 
International Legitimation of  Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community’, 10 
EJIL (1999) 23; Goodman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War’, 100 AJIL (2006) 107, 
at 108; Schrijver, ‘Challenges to the Prohibition to Use Force: Does the Straitjacket of  Article 2(4) UN 
Charter Begin to Gall to Much?’, in Blockker and Schrijver (eds), supra note 25, at 31, 39.
At their 2000 ministerial conference, the Non-Aligned Movement states declared, ‘We reject the so-
called “right” of  humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general 
principles of  international law’: Movement of  the Non-Aligned Countries, XIII Ministerial Conference, 
Cartagena, Colombia, 8–9 Apr. 2000, Final Document, at para. 263, available at: www.nam.gov.za/
xiiiminconf/final4.htm.
45 Cassese, supra note 44, at 25.
46 Ibid.; Corten, supra note 37, at 548–549 agrees; Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of  Force: Legal 
Aspects’, 10 EJIL (1999) 1, at 5.
47 Some Bright-Liners would say that in extreme humanitarian emergencies, military intervention might 
be morally justifiable even if  not legal, and that it is preferable that the law be broken in such cases than 
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Balancers argue that humanitarian intervention is permissible under certain circum-
stances even absent Security Council authorization.48 Again, the touchstone is usu-
ally objective reasonableness, judged in terms of  such factors as magnitude of  danger, 
proportionality of  response, and lack of  alternative means.49 This view gained some 
short-lived momentum during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, during which NATO intervened 
militarily to stop wide-scale Serbian atrocities in the face of  a deadlocked UN Security 
Council, as Russia and China had threatened to veto resolutions that authorized force.50
The debate between Bright-Liners and Balancers on this issue played out in the 
2005 UN debate about Responsibility to Protect, and the final outcome statement 
adopted by consensus reflected major concessions to Bright-Liners:
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means … to help protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and 
in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations.51
This formulation acknowledges flexible standards for striking policy balances, but 
it recognizes no legal authority to intervene in any humanitarian crisis absent the 
bright-line procedural trigger of  Security Council authorization.52
3. Non-state Threats
The growing capacity of  non-state actors, including terrorist groups, to wield vio-
lence on a massive scale across territorial borders increasingly poses questions about 
states’ authority to use force in response. Debates about resort to force against non-
state actors and legal form do not break down as neatly as do the other examples just 
discussed.53 In this context even some Bright-Liners acknowledge the need for some 
discretionary balancing, perhaps because the factual circumstances of  these cases 
assessment will have to be made of  how heavily such illegality weighs against all the circumstances of  a 
particular concrete case, and of  the efforts, if  any, undertaken by parties involved to get “as close to the 
law” as possible’: supra note 46, at 6.
48 See Brunnée and Toope, ‘The Use of  Force: International Law After Iraq’, 53 Int’l & Comp LQ (2004) 785, 
at 800; Wood, ‘Towards New Circumstances in Which the Use of  Force May Be Authorized?’, Blockker 
and Schrijver (eds), supra note 25, at 75, 82.
49 See, e.g., Reisman, ‘NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo’s Antinomies’, 93 AJIL (1999) 860, at 862; 
Sofaer, ‘International Law and Kosovo’, 36 Stanford J Int’l L (2000) 1, at 16.
50 See Stromseth, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change’, in J.l. 
Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (2003), 
at 232, 234–237; Roberts, ‘NATO’s “Humanitarian War” Over Kosovo’, 41 Survival (Sept. 1999) 102.
51 UN World Summit Outcome Document (2005), GA Res. 60/1, at para. 139.
52 But see Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, 101 AJIL (2007) 
99, at 120 (‘states did not categorically reject the option of  (individual or collective) unilateral action in 
the Outcome Document. This discrepancy leaves some leeway to argue that the concept of  responsibility 
to protect is not meant to rule out such action in the future’).
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tend to be so messy and unique. However, even in their acceptance of  doctrinal stan-
dards, Bright-Liners try to ‘brighten’ their formulas while Balancers prefer formulas 
that admit contextualized discretion.
As a threshold matter, at one extreme some Bright-Liners argue that self-defensive 
force is not permitted at all against non-state actors because non-state actors can-
not commit armed attacks.54 The ICJ has taken this view, for example in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Israeli Wall,55 though in the 2005 case concerning Armed Activities 
on the Territory of  the Congo, the Court seemed to take a half-step back and more ten-
tatively note that there was ‘no need to respond to the contentions of  the Parties as 
to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for 
a right of  self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces’.56 Following the 
September 2001 al-Qaeda attacks, Antonio Cassese lamented that forceful responses 
risked undermining bright-line self-defence rules:
So far, self-defence has been justified only against states…. As a consequence, the target was 
specified: the aggressor state. The purpose was clear: to repel the aggression. Hence also the 
duration of  the armed action in self-defence was fairly clear: until the end of  the aggression. 
Now, instead, all these conditions become fuzzy.57
This fuzziness is what bright-line rules and processes are designed to avoid.58
Other Bright-Liners, however, acknowledge that formalistic views of  self-defence 
must give way to the reality that non-state actors today can wage violence of  massive 
intensity, and that the UN Security Council recognized a corresponding right of  self-
defence in resolutions following the September 2001 al-Qaeda attacks.59 Balancers, 
meanwhile, agree that force is sometimes allowed against non-state actors, especially 
when they commit or threaten actions that would probably be characterized as armed 
attacks if  perpetrated by a state.60
54 See, e.g., Corten, supra note 37, at 126–197; Myjer and White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited 
Right to Self-Defence?’, 7 J Conflict & Security L (2002) 5, at 7.
55 [2004] ICJ Rep 136, at 194; Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of  the United Nations: 
A Commentary (2nd edn, 2002), at 788, 802 agrees (‘Acts of  terrorism committed by private groups or 
organizations as such are not armed attacks in the meaning of  Art. 51 …. But if  large scale acts of  terror-
ism of  private groups are attributable to a State, they are an armed attack in the sense of  Art. 51’).
56 Armed Activities on the Territory of  the Congo (Congo v. Uganda) [2006] ICJ Rep 168, at 223, para. 147. 
For a critique of  the ICJ’s decision on this point in the Israeli Wall case, arguing that it is not in line with 
contemporary state practice see Tams, ‘Light Treatment of  a Complex Problem: The Law of  Self-Defence 
in the Wall Case’, 16 EJIL (2005) 963, and for a discussion of  narrow constructions of  self-defence con-
sistent with the ICJ’s see Tams, ‘The Use of  Force Against Terrorists’, 20 EJIL (2009) 359, at 367–371.
57 A. Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of  International Law’, 12 EJIL 
(2001) 993, at 997.
58 See Gray, supra note 18, at 203; see also Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of  Pre-Emptive Force’, 14 EJIL 
(2003) 227, at 240 (‘recourse to a Security Council mandate is the only acceptable solution, both as a 
matter of  law and policy, where, in the light of  threats of  terrorism …, military action which cannot be 
construed as constituting self-defense seems to be required’); Henkin, supra note 23, at 62 (‘The excep-
tions in article 51 were limited to cases of  armed attack that are generally beyond doubt; a state’s respon-
sibility for acts of  terrorism is rarely beyond doubt and difficult to prove to international satisfaction’).
59 See Franck, ‘Terrorism and the Right of  Self-Defense’, 95 AJIL (2001) 839, at 840. See also SC Res 1368 
(2001) (recognizing the right to individual or collective self-defence in the wake of  attacks by non-state actors).
60 Greenwood, supra note 42, at 17; Schmitt, ‘Responding to Transnational Terrorism under the Jus Ad 
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With growing consensus that non-state attacks could give rise to self-defence, a signif-
icant parallel debate concerns under what conditions may attacks by non-state actors be 
attributed to a state for self-defence purposes or under what conditions may a state take 
self-defensive action against a non-state actor inside the territory of  another state. On 
these issues, it is widely regarded among Bright-Liners and Balancers alike that a state 
may exercise self-defensive force against a state that sufficiently supports or controls a 
terrorist or insurgent group, and that it may do so against terrorist targets within a state 
that is sufficiently unwilling or unable to eradicate the threats emanating from within its 
borders.61 However, when it comes to assessing sufficiency of  support/control or unwill-
ingness/inability, divergent preferences re-emerge with respect to doctrinal form.
Balancers emphasize that these cases often involve complex weighing of  self-defence 
rights against sovereignty rights,62 which necessarily involves assessing a number of  
interlocking, contextual factors, such as a territorial state’s capacity and readiness to 
take preventive action against non-state groups within its borders, the likelihood that 
its action will alleviate the threat, the magnitude of  the threat, and the availability 
of  other defensive options or means of  mitigating the threat.63 Reasonable necessity 
is especially difficult to define in advance with precision in cases involving terrorist 
groups because they tend to operate with stealth and unpredictability.64
While recognizing the difficulties of  crafting clear rules for the complexities of  
non-state threats, some Bright-Liners remain reluctant to cede as much discretion 
as Balancers do, so they look for ways to cabin it as rules would, such as by empha-
sizing formal procedures for validating assessments or placing great weight on read-
ily identifiable and visible factual conditions. For example, although Thomas Franck 
re cognizes that ‘[i]t is becoming clear that a victim-state may invoke Article 51 to take 
armed countermeasures … against any territory harboring, supporting or tolerating 
activities that culminate in, or are likely to give rise to, insurgent infiltrations or ter-
rorist attacks’,65 he insists that the victim state of  such threats or attacks cannot be 
trusted with applying the law unilaterally.66 Rather, these standards are subject to a 
‘quasi-jury’ or UN organs, namely the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and 
ICJ.67 Yoram Dinstein takes a different tack in recognizing that self-defence (or, in his 
words, ‘extra-territorial law enforcement’ using force) against terrorist targets within 
another state is legal when the host state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to prevent terrorist 
61 See Brunnée and Toope, supra note 28, at 296. For a thorough examination of  this issue see generally 
Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-Territorial Self-Defense’, 52 
Virginia J Int’l L (2012) 483.
62 See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, US Department of  State, ‘The Obama Administration and 
International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of  the American Society of  International Law, 
Washington, DC’, 25 Mar. 2010, available at: www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; 
Matheson, ‘Terrorism and the Laws of  War’, Crimes of  War Project, 21 Sept. 2001, available at: www.
crimesofwar.org/expert/attack-math.html.
63 See Brunnée and Toope, supra note 28, at 310; Schmitt, supra note 60, at 21–27.
64 See Schmitt, supra note 60, at 15–20; Sofaer, ‘Sixth Annual Waldemar A Solf  Lecture in International 
Law: Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense’, 126 Military L Rev (1989) 89, at 95.
65 Franck, supra note 10, at 67.
66 See ibid.














166 EJIL 24 (2013), 151–189
attacks.68 Although embracing that relatively flexible standard, he goes on to brighten 
it in ways that severely limit discretion with a combination of  more specific rules and 
sub-standards that come close to rules, including imposing requirements that a ter-
rorist attack have already occurred and be likely to occur again; that the absence of  
alternative means for preventing those attacks must be ‘demonstrated beyond reason-
able doubt’; and that any self-defensive force must take place soon after the terrorist 
attack ‘so that the cause (armed attack) and effect (self-defence) are plain for all to 
see’.69 Whether through strict procedural review or through attaching tight condi-
tions to multi-factor assessment, these doctrinal formulations reflect Bright-Liners’ 
efforts to check individual state evaluation and discretion – among those contemplat-
ing or using force and those judging it, alike.
3 Doctrinal Form and Substantive Policy
As the previous section illustrated, many contemporary debates about resort to force 
may be understood as choices about substantive policy (how permissive of  unilateral 
force should the regime be?) or they may be framed as choices about legal doctrinal 
form (should exceptions to UN Security Council authorization be regulated mostly by 
clear-cut rules or by binding yet flexible standards?). This section considers in more 
detail the relationship between substance and form in this area. It shows and explains 
a natural correlation between those choices – indeed, such a high correlation that the 
issue of  doctrinal form often receives little independent attention.
A Choice of  Doctrinal Form: Rules, Standards, and Institutional 
Context
Although bearing some superficial resemblance, the doctrinal form debate between 
Bright-Liners and Balancers is not simply the international law version of  the rules-
versus-standards debate so common in domestic law. Institutional setting is critical 
to the functioning of  any legal form, and with respect to force this means that doctri-
nal rules or standards must operate in a largely decentralized system lacking unitary 
adjudication and enforcement mechanisms.70
In the domestic law context, rules are generally thought to confine the decision-
maker to adjudicating facts in relation to fixed lines, whereas standards involve weigh-
ing or balancing various values and factors on a case-by-case basis. In the rich body 
of  scholarship in this area, legal theorists often credit rules with, among other things, 
predictability: the lines are clear, actors can easily plan accordingly, and observers 
68 Dinstein, supra note 19, at 217.
69 Ibid., at 220; see also Bothe, supra note 58, at 233 (calling it ‘doubtful’ that a state’s failure to stop terror-
ist attacks launched from its territory could give rise to self-defence authority in response).
70 In some domestic settings this distinction is not always so stark. See generally Goldsmith and Levinson, 
‘Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law’, 122 Harvard L Rev (2009) 1791 
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or judges can readily determine whether actions complied with or violated them. 
Standards, and the adjudicative discretion that goes with them, have the potential 
to strike better case-by-case policy balances through flexible adaptation to circum-
stances, but at some cost to predictability.71
Contemporary international legal debates between Bright-Liners and Balancers 
echo these familiar tropes to a degree, but the choice about form is quite different from 
the domestic context for several reasons. Most important, in domestic law the rigid 
rules or flexible standards are often applied by formal, structured, and authoritative 
adjudicators (e.g., courts or administrative agencies) whereas, as explained above, the 
international legal system with regard to force outside the Security Council’s authori-
zation is mostly decentralized and unstructured.72 Formal and universally authorita-
tive legal judgments are the exception, not the norm, with respect to Bright-Liners’ 
rules and Balancers’ standards.
Additionally, though, Bright-Liners’ rules and Balancers’ standards operate as 
exceptions to a baseline prohibition of  force with a formal legal authorization process 
– the UN Security Council and its mandate – that both orientations regard as well-
founded and that is sometimes capable of  producing bright outcomes. With both sides 
agreeing that this process is one way – indeed, usually the preferred way (especially 
for Bright-Liners) – to authorize exceptions to the prohibition of  force, the bulk of  
the debate is over what supplemental authorities to use force exist, and whether those 
exceptional authorities are defined by rigid rules or flexible standards.73
One resulting difference from the usual rule-versus-standard comparison in the 
domestic context is that the addition of  a collective UN Security Council process 
offers Bright-Liners a way to mitigate a common concern with rigid rules: that they 
give inadequate consideration to case-specific contextual factors.74 Normally, hard 
and fast rules, by striking a balance among competing values in advance, produce 
results that are under- or over-protective of  one or another value in many individual 
71 This is a gross simplification of  an extensive debate, and my purpose here is to draw on some of  its major 
strands and conceptual categories, but not to reinvent it. On choices between rules and standards, 
especially in American law, see generally F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules (1991); Kennedy, ‘Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication’, 89 Harvard L Rev (1976) 1685; Sullivan, ‘Foreword: The Justices 
of  Rules and Standards’, 106 Harvard L Rev (1992) 22. Oscar Schachter developed a similar theory about 
choices between ‘rules’, ‘principles’, and ‘policies’ in international law: see O. Schachter, International Law 
in Theory and Practice (1991), at 18–31, and applied it to his study of  international law regulating force: 
see ibid., at 136–175; Schachter, supra note 10, at 131–142. David Kennedy situates related distinctions 
among doctrinal forms in a larger set of  propositions about different theoretical approaches to interna-
tional law: see Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box’, 32 NYU J Int’l L & Politics 
(2000) 335.
72 See Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’, 99 AJIL (2005) 581, at 589.
73 As mentioned at the outset, Bright-Liners’ and Balancers’ preferences for clear-cut rules versus discre-
tionary standards are specific to this Charter regime, which carves authorized exceptions to a baseline 
prohibition on force; they do not reflect a general normative commitment to legal stringency v. flexibility. 
One could imagine the respective preferences looking quite different if  the Charter were reformulated, 
e.g., to require force in a set of  circumstances, or if  there were a presumption that force is permitted unless 
the UN SC decides otherwise. Other formulations are considered below in sect. 5A.
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circumstances. This may not be such a problem when the costs of  individual adjudi-
cation of  lots of  cases are very high or when the stakes of  poor legal tailoring to any 
particular case are not very dire, but in the jus ad bellum context the application of  this 
law is (thankfully) infrequent and the consequences of  poor fit between law regulating 
force and any particular security crisis can be catastrophic to peace, a state or people’s 
survival, or other interests. Were bright-line rules governing resort to force operating 
alone, of  particular concern would be under-protection of  defence against threats to 
security or vulnerable populations, which vary considerably and evolve as technology 
and other features of  the international system change. But the UN Security Council 
process promises – in optimistic assessments – to remedy that under-inclusiveness of  
inflexible rules, because its broad mandate allows it to take account of  those varying 
and evolving factors.75
Put another way, in domestic law a choice between rules and standards usually 
determines whether a formal adjudicator should have flexible discretion or not.76 In 
the international arena, because they define exceptions to the UN Security Council’s 
otherwise broad authority and because law regarding force then exists in a decen-
tralized and informal institutional context, a choice between Bright-Liners’ rules and 
Balancers’ standards regarding force determines not just whether there should be any 
discretion but where it should be lodged: rules shift discretion to the Security Council 
while standards leave more of  it in the hands of  states and other actors that may be 
judging it.
B Correlations of  Form and Substance: Balancing Risk
It should be apparent by now – especially in light of  the role doctrinal form plays in allo-
cating legal discretion – that the debate between rules and standards for regulating resort 
to force is heavily laden with opposing views of  risks and how best to address them.77 It 
is also heavily laden with politics, insofar as any actor’s risk assessment depends on its 
power and vulnerability to power – not just in the narrow sense of  how much military 
might a state has but also how military power or concerns about it fit within a state’s for-
eign policy strategy. States like the United States, with strength to defeat or deter devel-
oping threats and a willingness to pursue interventionist policies, will incline towards 
doctrinal formulas that permit discretion; those who may be targeted with power or who 
fear its abuse or the consequences of  its use incline toward formulas that restrict it.78
75 See Bothe, supra note 58, at 239–240; Falk, ‘What Future for the UN System of  War Prevention’, 97 AJIL 
(2003) 590, at 597–598.
76 See Schauer, supra note 71, at 159.
77 Compare, e.g., A. Cassese, ‘Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of  the Charter 
System’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Current Legal Regulation of  the Use of  Force (1986), at 505, 516 (‘the risks 
of  abuse should lead us to interpret [the self-defense provision in] Art. 51 very strictly and consider it as 
giving only very exceptional licence’), with Glennon, supra note 34, at 552–553 (‘Mistakes may be made. 
It is better, however, that the price of  those mistakes be paid by states that so posture themselves than by 
innocent states asked patiently to await slaughter’).
78 Compare Corten, supra note 4, at 821–822 (concluding that doctrinal-analytical methodology 
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Generally speaking, Bright-Liners favour stringent limits on force and favour collec-
tive decision-making, while Balancers are more tolerant of  unilateral action and have 
more limited confidence in collective decision-making. Indeed, the doctrinal prefer-
ence for cabining force outside the UN Security Council process with either rules or 
standards correlates so highly with preference for very narrow versus more permissive 
licence that choice of  doctrinal form – rules or standards for defining those exceptional 
authorities – is almost never considered much of  an independent variable.
In practice, Balancers’ flexible standards approach tends to be more permissive 
than Bright-Liners’ strict rule approach, because satisfaction of  the latter (either sat-
isfying a rule or gaining UN Security Council approval) will virtually always satisfy 
Balancers’ criteria for reasonableness. Balancers’ standards usually treat satisfaction 
of  Bright-Liners’ preferred rules as per se reasonable – for example, an actual or tem-
porally imminent attack would meet the standard of  reasonable necessity – but then 
also admit some additional discretion.
Bright-Liners tend to have greater confidence than do Balancers in the UN Security 
Council’s capacity to serve as a backstop against new threats, so they are comfort-
able drawing lines that leave little additional discretion beyond that process.79 That 
UN Security Council voting system at the heart of  Bright-Liners’ approach contains 
a strong structural inclination averse to force. A supermajority of  Security Council 
member states and no vetoes from the five permanent members are required to autho-
rize a military action or threat, demanding consensus among a diverse group of  states.
At the same time as Bright-Liners view this collective decision-making mechanism 
as adequate for determining when most specific threats have grown to the point that 
forceful measures are necessary,80 they also believe that individual state legal discre-
tion or auto-interpretation outside that process or beyond narrowly drawn bright-line 
rules poses too high a risk of  needless war, whether due to bad faith exploitation of  
legal standards or good faith but unchecked and misguided assessments of  threats.81 
Some Bright-Liners go further, and believe that categorical rules are necessary to 
reinforce the fragile idea that war is evil, at least when it is exercised outside the UN 
Charter’s collective security mechanisms.82 They worry that structuring the law on 
resort to force in terms of  flexible standards – standards that require balancing the 
harms of  war against other values like protection of  vital state interests and human 
International Legal Reform in Ourt Time: A TWAIL Perspective’, 43 Osgoode Hall LJ (2005) 171, at 172–
173 (arguing, from a developing world perspective, that arguments about adapting international law to 
account for ‘new’ threats reflect powerful states’ political ambitions).
79 Compare European Union Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), at 9 (emphasizing the 
primacy of  the UN SC in a rule-based international order that adapts to new threats).
80 See Falk, ‘What Future for the UN Charter System of  War Prevention?’, 97 AJIL (2003) 590, at 598; 
O’Connell, ‘The United Nations Security Council and the Authorization of  Force: Renewing the Council 
Through Law Reform’, in Blockker and Schrijver (eds), supra note 25, at 47, 55–56; Schrijver, supra note 
44, at 44; Weiner, supra note 34, at 448–490.
81 See Koh, supra note 31, at 108; Weiner, supra note 34, at 494; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at paras 187–200, 227–232 agrees.
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rights – risks undermining fundamental prohibitions of  war as an instrument of  pol-
icy, by treating it as just one among many policy objectives in the mix.83 Bright rules 
do not eliminate war as a contingency, but they help to suppress it from the policy 
menu. Resort to flexible standards, Michael Bothe argues, puts international law on ‘a 
slippery slope, one which would make us slide back into the nineteenth century when 
war was not illegal’.84
To Bright-Liners, then, clear and determinate rules help steel the international sys-
tem against dangerous pressures towards use of  force.85 To those ‘impatient’ with the 
resulting decision-making formula, the UN High-Level Panel report responds that, ‘in 
a world full of  perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of  
non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legal-
ity of  unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be 
accepted’.86 For Bright-Liners, the fact that the contemporary world poses new types 
of  risks far beyond those contemplated by the UN Charter’s drafters makes it more, not 
less, important that the UN Security Council retain a tight monopoly over the use of  
force; new types of  threats – or perceptions of  them – make individual state discretion 
about the use of  force not more necessary but more dangerous.
Balancers worry that, notwithstanding the broad consensus that sometimes these 
threats might reach a point at which armed intervention is appropriate, the UN 
Security Council will rarely arrive at that conclusion quickly enough, if  at all.87 To 
them, there are worse horribles than unilateral war, sometimes including failure to 
protect against security threats or to stop mass atrocities.88 Balancers’ reasonableness 
formulas reflect limited confidence in the Security Council’s capacity for dealing with 
such threats of  WMD proliferation, massive humanitarian catastrophes, and trans-
national terrorism, as described above.89 Flexible standards are a way of  lodging legal 
discretion in states (again, not just those who would use force but those who would 
judge them) sometimes needed to deal with threats that the Security Council cannot 
or will not deal with.90
In other words, Balancers believe Bright-Liners have the risk assessment backwards: 
inflexible rules combined with the slow and rigid Security Council process still fail to 
constrain the most dangerous aggressors, because they are determined to violate the 
law whatever its form; in the meantime, however, that approach unduly constrains 
the ability of  those who oppose aggression to deal with it. ‘The underlying problem’, 
83 The ICJ has referred to the prohibition on the use of  force as ‘a conspicuous example’ of  jus cogens: ibid., 
at 100, para. 190; see also Gray, supra note 18, at 27 (‘The rules of  international law in this area clearly 
also serve a declaratory function; they set out the goal to be aimed at, the ideal that states adhere to’).
84 Bothe, supra note 58, at 238; Koh, supra note 31, at 102–103 agrees (arguing that standards for anticipa-
tory or pre-emptive self-defence lead to a slippery slope erosion of  norms against force).
85 See Cassese, supra note 77, at 516; Schrijver, supra note 44, at 39–44.
86 See UN High-Level Panel, supra note 20, at para. 191.
87 See Wedgwood, ‘The Fall of  Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense’, 
97 AJIL (2003) 576, at 577.
88 See Sofaer, supra note 49, at 201–221.
89 See supra sect. 2B.
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writes Sofaer of  Bright-Liners’ rules, ‘stems from the premise that self-defense must be 
restricted in order to enhance international peace and security. To the contrary, self-
defense is a key element in any sensible program to supplement the inadequate, col-
lective effort of  the Security Council.’91 Setting substantive criteria by which to assess 
legality of  force is a way of  calibrating appropriate equilibria among widely shared 
policy objectives such as individual state security, international stability, and humani-
tarian values.92
In sum, the relationship between form and substance tends to look like Figure 1. 
Bright-liners occupy a position of  strict prohibitions on force while Balancers occupy 
a position of  relative permissiveness. The flexible standards approach of  Balancers is 
virtually never pressed by those who want extremely stringent proscriptions of  force, 
and the doctrinal rules approach of  Bright-Liners is virtually never pressed by those 
more accommodating of  force as a necessary evil.
Why not? In theory, the choice between rules and standards should be substance-
neutral with respect to competing policy values. That is, there is no inherent sub-
stantive valence to the doctrinal form of  exceptions to a prohibition like Article 2(4), 
because, whatever policy values would be balanced by a flexible standard, a corre-
sponding rule could theoretically be crafted broadly or narrowly.93
One could imagine, to illustrate, very permissive exceptions to the prohibition of  
resort to force structured as bright-line rules – much more permissive than the stan-
dards usually advocated by Balancers. For example, a right of  self-defence might be 
recognized against any state from which a specified category of  terrorist attacks was 
carried out (that is, a self-defence rule based on factual circumstances of  an attack 
and its links to particular territory). Or UN Security Council voting rules might be 
amended to eliminate the Permanent-5 members’ vetoes in cases of  genocide or mass 
atrocities and to authorize preventive force if  a bare majority of  the UN Security 
Council assents. Such bright-line rules would be significantly more permissive than 
even most Balancers would prefer.
One could also imagine very stringent standards, yet still retaining some elasticity, 
that essentially approximate the strict rules usually advocated by Bright-Liners. For 
example, anticipatory self-defence might be deemed legally permissible as necessary 
only when no reasonable state could conclude otherwise – in other words by setting 
an extremely high discretionary bar or burden of  persuasion.
These notional options could populate the empty quadrants of  Figure 1. I return 
in section 5 to this issue and consider why those quadrants tend to remain unfilled 
in international legal discourse. For now the point is to observe the high correlation 
between policy judgements about the utility or dangers of  force and advocacy of  legal 
rules or standards, which prompts questions whether that correlation really is related 
91 Sofaer, supra note 29, at 561.
92 See Reisman, ‘Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, 
and Prospects’, in L.F. Damrosch and D.J. Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New International Order 
(1991), at 26, 43.
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to doctrinal form or is only related to the specific substantive content that tends to go 
with each form. In other words, does doctrinal form do any ‘work’ on its own? The 
next sections take up these issues and suggest that it does.
4 Doctrinal Form and Force in the International 
Legal System
Because debate about doctrinal form tends to correlate with substantive policy views 
about force – very limited use of  force in a narrow set of  conditions or collectively versus 
more flexibility for states or groups of  states to respond to a larger set of  contingencies – 
it is easy to neglect other ways in which form might matter. Aside from competing policy 
views about the utility and danger of  force, Bright-Liners’ and Balancers’ preferences 
with respect to doctrinal form also reflect different understandings of  how international 
law operates and the necessary conditions for its effectiveness. Specifically, debate about 
doctrinal form reflects differences over how law affects enforcement pressures, or the 
way legal argumentation speaks to audiences external to a state. It also reflects closely-
related differences over how doctrinal form generates compliance pull within states, or 
the way legal argumentation speaks internally to state decision-makers.
A Form and Enforcement Pressures
Both orientations assume that in the absence of  centralized enforcement mecha-
nisms, much enforcement of  international law regarding force depends on the costs 
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(political, military, economic, etc.) that other states and international actors impose 
on law-breakers, based in part on their own legal appraisal.94 Bright-Liners tend to 
regard both ex ante clarity of  rules and processes themselves as well as ex post clarity 
of  legal judgments of  force generated by rules as critical to effective and just interna-
tional legal enforcement. Balancers view the decentralized international legal system 
as capable of  distinguishing legally appropriate and inappropriate force based on more 
flexible standards weighted with objective criteria, and in ways also capable of  effec-
tively and justly constraining state behaviour.
For Bright-Liners, determinacy – that is, the ability to generate understanding of  
what the law permits and what it does not – is a critical element of  enforcement; with-
out it, they believe, law collapses into unconstrained state discretion.95 Of  particular 
concern to Bright-Liners is the risk of  pretextual aggression, or states’ representing a 
use of  force as justified by legitimate considerations when in fact it is rooted in imper-
missible motivations. If  the law is flexible, it is too easy for states to mask aggression 
behind claims of  legality and avoid sanction.96
According to Franck, ‘[r]ules that each member of  a community is free to interpret 
for itself, without fear of  definitive contradiction, are truly rules lacking in determi-
nacy, for they leave each member free to assert that “the rules are whatever I say they 
are.” They then have no objective content whatsoever.’97 Bright-line rules and rigid 
processes are capable of  independent and objective determination by other states and 
third parties when applied to a given set of  facts, whereas the more flexibly a standard 
can be interpreted the more difficult it is for them to adjudge compliance.98 Indeed, 
it was in part because flexible standards were too malleable in the hands of  would-be 
aggressors, Bright-Liners sometimes argue, that the UN Charter’s architects codified 
a bright-line exception in Article 51 as the only alternative to UN Security Council 
process.99
Bright-Liners might be especially concerned about the slide from objective standards 
to unrestrained subjectivity with respect to international legal regulation of  military 
force because there is no single ‘reasonable state’ akin to the hypothesized ‘reasonable 
94 See Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of  Preemptive Self-Defense’, 50 Villanova L Rev (2005) 699, at 702–705.
95 See Franck, supra note 39, at 95–96.
96 See Lobel, ‘The Use of  Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of  Sudan and Afghanistan’, 24 
Yale J Int’l L (1999) 537, at 557. Harold Koh argues that flexible ‘standards are just too easily manipu-
lated by those who want to use military force’. Therefore, he concludes, ‘If  we want to create a meaning-
ful default position against unwarranted use of  force, in these emergency situations, we need bright-line 
rules’: Koh, supra note 31, at 112–113.
97 Franck, supra note 39, at 102.
98 See Joyner, supra note 37, at 256–258; see also Franck, supra note 13, at 606–607 (arguing that Art. 51 
is ‘self-executing’ because ‘the facts pertaining to an armed attack – “who attacked whom?” – are readily 
adduced and falsified claims … can usually be exposed’).
99 See Henkin, ‘The Invasion of  Panama Under International Law: A  Gross Violation’, 29 Columbia J 
Transnat’l L (1991) 293, at 312 (arguing that aggressors have always justified their actions in term 
defending ‘just’ causes, and it was because the flexibility of  standards allowed them to do so – or 
‘[b]ecause the “common law” on the use of  force failed’ – that ‘the law was codified, established clearer, 
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person’ of  many domestic law contexts.100 Vast disparities in power, wealth, prestige, 
interests, and political systems make it impossible to discern a single, universal stan-
dard. Instead the question becomes: how would a reasonable state in the position of  
the one claiming a right to use force act? That is hard to answer without delving into 
the complex strategic calculus of  individual state decision-making.101
Not only do vast power disparities make it difficult to apply context-balancing 
standards in establishing violations, and therefore to subject violators to costs, but 
Bright-Liners contend that any flexible discretion will result in arbitrary or unjust 
enforcement that discredits law. In their view, clear rules help to prevent phoney or 
unprincipled enforcement, because they are more difficult for strong states to pervert 
in pursuit of  their own national interests. Black and white rules are less susceptible to 
manipulation – which strong states are better capable of  doing with impunity – and 
therefore they will be used more appropriately and responsibly than flexible standards.
It must be pointed out that, in practice, UN Security Council decisions do not always 
produce the determinative clarity Bright-Liners seek – and Bright-Liners should 
acknowledge this limitation. Take, for example, the 2003 Iraq war, which two of  the 
five Permanent Security Council members argued was authorized by prior Security 
Council resolutions dating back to the first Gulf  War, while the other three regarded 
it as legally unsanctioned.102 Some humanitarian interventions – such as NATO’s 
1999 intervention in Kosovo, regarded widely as at least ‘legitimate’, if  not strictly 
legal, because it lacked Security Council approval, and earlier military actions by West 
African regional forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone, implicitly approved by the Security 
Council after the fact103 – show that reality is often less tidy than Bright-Liners might 
hope. Moreover, bright rules and processes do not necessarily produce universally 
acknowledged interpretations because there is often disagreement about key facts, or 
states contort facts to fit within bright lines.104 But on the whole, UN Security Council 
voting or bright-line exceptions to the prohibition of  force tend to yield relatively clear 
and widely recognizable and respected answers for at least a wide swathe of cases.
Balancers respond that flexible standards are capable of  retaining more objective 
and informative content than Bright-Liners acknowledge. Requirements of  reason-
able necessity and proportionality are on the one hand elastic, in that they adjust to 
accommodate new threats and particular circumstances, yet they are on the other 
hand capable of  external evaluation.105 Other players in the international system, 
including third party states and non-governmental actors, can assess uses of  force 
100 See S. Brown, The Illusion of  Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century (2003), at 113; 
G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force Is Justified and Why (2008), at 173–174.
101 See generally Kaye, supra note 21 (discussing the difficulties of  judging the reasonableness of  state deci-
sion-making, especially amid crises).
102 See Taft IV and Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and International Law’, 97 AJIL (2003) 557. More recently, 
debates have arisen among coalition partners engaged in operations against Libya as to the extent of  
authority to use force contemplated by SC Res 1973: see Totaro, ‘Europeans at Odds Over How Far They 
Can Go’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 Mar. 2011, at 7.
103 See Franck, supra note 10, at 155–170.
104 See Coll, supra note 26, at 616–617.
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against widely recognized standards and criteria that comprise reasonableness, and 
they can react accordingly, whether approvingly of  good arguments or disapprovingly 
of  bad ones.106 Such analysis is not open-ended; it is routine in many domestic law 
settings, they point out, where self-defence and other uses of  violence are often judged 
according to contextualized reasonableness.107
In contrast to Bright-Liners’ insistence on clear lines likely to give rise to broad con-
sensus as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of  specific instances of  force, Balancers 
are comfortable with a legal regime that does not always, or even often, produce black 
and white answers.108 They recognize that many uses of  force may fall within some 
grey area, but that the shade of  grey matters quite a lot. As Abram Chayes, who was 
essentially a Balancer as US State Department Legal Adviser during the height of  the 
Cold War, explained in his volume on resort to force and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
‘[i]f  [law] cannot divide the universe into mutually exclusive blacks and whites, it can 
help in differentiating the infinite shades of  grey that are the grist of  the decision-
process’.109 Even in the absence of  legal determinations commanding near universal 
consensus, international law still exerts enforcement pressures, among other reasons 
because the relative strength of  legal arguments affects internal deliberations (consid-
ered further below) and the ability to justify actions abroad (and therefore affects costs 
associated with options).110
Of  course, Balancers concede, flexible standards allow aggressors to assert claims of  
self-defence or other justifiable force, but that does not mean they will pay no price for 
weak claims that other actors deny. The relative persuasiveness of  legal justifications 
in light of  context matters greatly.111 The United States and United Kingdom justified 
their 2003 invasion of  Iraq as necessary to enforce prior UN Security Council resolu-
tions dating back to the first Gulf  War, and while many states were convinced by those 
arguments, others were not, and the latters’ opposition or scepticism proved costly to 
the coalition’s war effort and post-war diplomacy.112 Russia argued that its 2008 use 
of  force against Georgia was justified on a range of  grounds including humanitarian 
protection, but most states discarded those analytical reasonings as weak and unper-
suasive, and Russia suffered diplomatic and economic costs as a result.113
True, powerful states may be more able to resist or tolerate approbation and the 
costs of  weak justification for their actions – and Balancers should acknowledge this 
disparity. But powerful states are also more likely to worry about the precedential 
106 See Reisman, supra note 92, at 46.
107 See Sofaer, supra note 29, at 561.
108 This is similar to what Sean Murphy describes as ‘Protean Jus Ad Bellum’: see Murphy, supra note 15, 
at 23.
109 A. Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (1974), at 102–103.
110 See ibid., at 103–104.
111 Compare Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of  the Better Argument’, 14 EJIL (2003) 
437 (analysing why legal arguments, while not decisive, often shape UN SC debates because of  their 
persuasive value and have an impact on positions taken).
112 See Murphy, ‘Assessing the Legality of  Invading Iraq’, 92 Georgetown LJ (2004) 173, at 251–257.
113 See ‘A Deal, for Now: Russia and the West’, Economist, 9 Sept. 2008; Bernard, ‘Georgia and Russia 
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value of  their actions and inclined to avoid arguments that, to the extent that they 
are taken seriously, could be exploited by others.114 And, true, vast disparities in power 
mean there is no single ‘reasonable state’ by which to judge actions, but that is a rea-
son to adopt criteria that account for different states’ capabilities and vulnerabilities, 
not for adopting inflexible formulas.
To Balancers, Bright-Liners’ efforts to promote just and principled enforcement 
through clear and rigid rules, and thereby strengthen the justificatory potency of  law, 
actually perverts the justness of  jus ad bellum. If  we lived in a world of  black and white 
violations, then bright-line legal rules and enforcement would make sense. But if  we 
live a world of  grey, then we need a flexible enforcement regime; it would be equally 
unjust to apply a bright-line regime to a grey-shaded world as to apply a grey-shaded 
regime to a black and white world.115 And, indeed, we do live in such a grey world, 
Balancers argue: contexts like humanitarian intervention to stop mass atrocities or 
efforts to prevent ungoverned territories from being used by hostile groups to launch 
attacks cannot fit neatly into legal boxes, and the UN Security Council’s actions and 
inactions with respect to authorizing force are themselves often capricious.
Both Bright-Liners and Balancers recognize that enforcement of  use-of-force law 
remains very decentralized, but they draw different conclusions about what that 
means for doctrinal form. Bright-Liners emphasize legal clarity or determinacy as 
necessary to compensate for the lack of  centralized enforcement, as one would find in 
domestic legal settings: ‘[t]he more indeterminate a norm, the more essential the pro-
cess by which, in practice, the norm can be made more specific’.116 Flexible standards 
may retain their objective content in domestic law settings because there are mech-
anisms like courts for reviewing them and providing authoritative meaning. However, 
‘reasonableness and proportionality are concepts which are difficult to operationalize 
in the context of  a decentralized system. They open the door to arbitrariness and sub-
jectivity.’117 According to Louis Henkin:
In our decentralized international political system with primitive institutions and underdevel-
oped law enforcement machinery, it is important that Charter norms – which go to the heart 
of  international order and implicate war and peace in the nuclear age – be clear, sharp, and 
comprehensive; as independent as possible of  judgments of  degree and of  issues of  fact; as 
invulnerable as can be to self-serving interpretations and to temptations to conceal, distort, or 
mischaracterize events.118
114 See Chayes, supra note 109, at 65; Schachter, ‘Self-Defense & the Rule of  Law’, 83 AJIL (1989) 259, at 
266.
115 See M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th edn, 2006), at 80, 85.
116 Franck, supra note 39, at 102; see also Dinstein, supra note 19, at 168 (arguing that flexible standards 
require close supervision by the UN SC); Franck, supra note 13, at 608 (‘the problem of  the abuse of  
exceptions is particularly evident in a system like that established by the UN Charter, where there is no 
automatic recourse to a judiciary with authority to determine authoritatively whether, in the circum-
stances, an exception has been validly invoked’).
117 Bothe, supra note 58, at 239; see also Dinstein, supra note 19, at 185–188 (arguing that lack of  a compe-
tent international forum empowered to review the legality of  force opens self-defence standards to abuse); 
T. Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of  the UN Charter (2010), at 324.
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In other words, the international legal system lacks formal adjudicative processes nec-
essary to make flexible standards operate effectively – unless, that is, the law provides 
those formal processes, such as by requiring UN Security Council adjudication.
Balancers are more sanguine about a diffuse and informal legal system to check 
state discretion, or at least they are resigned to it. Michael Reisman notes, too, that 
‘[i]nternational law is still largely a decentralized process, in which much lawmaking 
(particularly for the most innovative matters) is initiated by unilateral claim, whether 
explicit or behavioral’. Rather than seeing it as something to be remedied with bright-
line legal forms, he and other Balancers view that decentralized enforcement struc-
ture as capable of  nuanced assessment based on persuasiveness of  arguments and 
widely shared values, standards, and goals.119
Furthermore, Balancers view that decentralized structure as well adapted to meet-
ing shifting security challenges.120 Over time, determining legality ‘through appraisal 
of  the factors that justify or undercut proposed uses of  force, and a sharing of  that 
evaluation with other states and the public … enables international law to develop 
incrementally and under a healthy, collective scrutiny’.121 Application of  standards 
induces continuous exploration and deliberation of  potentially relevant contextual 
factors. That is, rather than compensating for lack of  centralized enforcement with 
legal rules and processes that promise clarity and consensus, Balancers accept some 
legal doubt and the fluid processes by which flexible standards are applied as necessary 
to account for unpredictable contingencies and exceptional circumstances, especially 
amid uncertainty as to future threats.
B Form and Compliance Pulls
Closely related to divergent assumptions about external enforcement pressures are 
assumptions about compliance, or the degree to which states internalize international 
norms in their decision-making. Compliance is probably especially difficult (and espe-
cially necessary) to promote with respect to force because it implicates states’ core 
national security interests.122 To Bright-Liners, compliance depends on the capacity 
of  law to instruct. To Balancers, it depends on its capacity to inform and persuade.
For Bright-Liners, the sharpness of  rules is important to compliance in ways simi-
lar to enforcement: ‘[i]ndeterminate normative standards not only make it harder to 
know what conformity is expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance. 
Put conversely, the more determinate the standard, the more difficult it is to resist the 
pull of  the rule to compliance and to justify noncompliance.’123 Clear lines help to 
119 Reisman, supra note 92, at 90; see also Johnstone, supra note 111, at 448–450, 475–476 (arguing that 
legal norms are capable of  objective application and in ways that are important to justifying actions).
120 See Reisman, supra note 92, at 90; Taylor, ‘The End of  Imminence?’, 27 Washington Q (2004) 57, at 59.
121 Sofaer, supra note 49, at 21; see also Stromseth, supra note 50, at 244 (arguing that ambiguity as to the 
legal status of  humanitarian intervention is ‘fertile ground for the gradual emergence of  normative con-
sensus, over time, based on practice and case-by-case decision-making’).
122 See Murphy, supra note 94, at 702.
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internalize norms and hold in check some natural tendency of  state decision-makers 
to seek latitude with respect to force, especially in crises.124
Whereas Bright-Liners are concerned that the same indeterminacy of  flexible stan-
dards that undermines external enforcement pressures will undermine the seriousness 
states will attach to them, Balancers see a greater danger that inflexible rules will fail 
to match policy-makers’ perceived needs, particularly amid security or humanitarian 
crises, and will therefore lose their legitimacy.125 While sharing some roots, this goes 
beyond the familiar realist or rational choice theory argument that states’ compliance 
with international law derives from congruence with states’ narrow self-interest;126 it 
accepts that legitimacy and fairness may matter and exert independent pull but holds 
that those features depend on the persuasive strength of  law in meeting contingencies 
more than its directive clarity. Sufficient consonance with the method of  policy analy-
sis that national security decision-makers use when contemplating forceful options 
is also critical, Balancers believe, to true internationalization of  law regulating force.
As Sofaer explains, ‘[s]tatesmen acting in good faith to protect their nations do not 
take artificial rules seriously’, but instead ‘they are more likely to respect standards 
rationally related to concerns they recognize as appropriate’.127 The vitality of  the law 
governing self-defence is especially dependent upon the ability of  this law to adapt to 
contemporary challenges in a manner that decision-makers and security profession-
als view as sensible. For this task, flexible standards of  the sort applied by Balancers 
are promising because they directly address the same judgments these governmental 
actors are forced to make and assess them in recognizable terms.128 Balancers prize 
deliberation about the use of  force, and objective criteria stimulate and guide it.
Bright-Liners acknowledge a weak spot here, that continued respect for the Security 
Council’s authoritative primacy depends on states’ confidence that it will wield it 
responsibly.129 While recognizing the need for any legal regime to meet states’ per-
ceived security needs, however, Bright-Liners are not sympathetic to Balancers’ argu-
ments that rigid rules and processes are too much in tension with the way individual 
states view protection of  their interests. They are supposed to be in tension – they are 
designed to constrain the tendencies of  states that might otherwise dictate forceful 
responses. The answer lies not in reformulating their preferred norms, however, but in 
redoubling states’ commitment to them.130 Balancers’ alternative approach is a self-
fulfilling prophecy, Bright-Liners might argue, because if  states plan and organize for 
future contingencies as though Security Council authorization will not be required 
124 See Koh, supra note 31, at 114.
125 P. Bobbitt, Terror and Consent (2008), at 452; Coll, supra note 26, at 613, 616; Reisman, supra note 92, at 
82; Sofaer, supra note 29, at 549.
126 J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of  International Law (2005), at 9.
127 Sofaer, supra note 30, at 225.
128 See Glennon, supra note 34, at 557; Stromseth, ‘Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment’, 97 
AJIL (2003) 628, at 637.
129 See Joyner, supra note 37, at 256–257; Slaughter, ‘Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand 
Themes of  UN Reform’, 99 AJIL (2005) 619.
130 See Charney, ‘Editorial Comments: The Use of  Force Against Terrorism and International Law’, 95 AJIL 
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for force beyond certain narrow exceptions, they have little incentive to work towards 
ensuring that the process will operate dependably.
Note that both orientations harbour biases about state decision-making processes 
and their regard for international law, and those biases underlie some of  their rela-
tive confidence in mechanisms for generating compliance. Bright-Liners argue that 
rules are needed because individual states cannot be trusted to apply and abide by 
flexible standards in good faith. Flexibility becomes manipulability or objective assess-
ment of  contextual factors becomes subjective opinion, they contend, because states 
are tempted to mask their self-interested designs behind stretched legal cloth. Clear 
rules and rigid processes cannot be so easily manipulated, making states more likely 
to abide by them.
When it comes to defending the UN Security Council’s authoritative monopoly to 
authorize force beyond bright-line exceptions, however, Bright-Liners have more con-
fidence in member states’ good faith decision-making and willingness to subordinate 
their individual self-interest to the common good.131 In the halls of  individual defence 
and foreign ministries, the argument seems to go, decision-makers often operate in 
bad or at least questionable faith, but in the UN Security Council chamber – where 
Bright-Liners want to channel processes of  persuasion – state representatives often 
(though certainly not always132) operate in good faith, or at least better faith.
Arguments by Balancers reflect similar, but reversed, assumption asymmetries 
about states’ decision-making. They often argue that the UN Security Council can-
not be trusted effectively and dispassionately to adjudicate on reasonable necessity of  
force, because member states’ strategic interests dictate their voting.133 That scepti-
cism fuels Balancers’ unease with placing exclusive discretion beyond narrow bright-
line exceptions in the Security Council’s hands.
At the same time as they doubt the Security Council’s tendency to exercise respon-
sible judgement, however, Balancers argue that individual states should be entrusted 
to apply flexible standards. States – or at least some states – will faithfully apply flexible 
standards based on shared international goals by incorporating them into their uni-
lateral deliberative processes about force.
In sum, Bright-Liners tend to be worried that legal regimes regulating use of  force 
are highly susceptible to abuse, because states will be inclined to stretch or manipulate 
exceptions to prohibitions. Balancers also worry that the legal regime regulating force 
is fragile, but their solution is to incorporate more bend rather than to fortify rigidity.
Both orientations towards doctrinal form begin with a basic recognition that the 
international legal system lacks strong, centralized enforcement structures. Bright-
Liners, distrustful of  individual state discretion, seek to compensate for that institu-
tional weakness with doctrinal form that produces at least some of  the same outputs 
131 See Franck, ‘Reflections on Force and Evidence’, 100 Proceedings Annual Meeting American Society Int’l L 
(2006) 51, at 54.
132 Bright-Liners often acknowledge that SC members sometimes cast votes and vetoes for self-interested, 
strategic ends: see Dinstein, supra note 19, at 283–284. This was certainly true during the Cold War, 
when bloc rivalries usually produced deadlock: see Franck, supra note 10, at 3.
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that centralized enforcement structures would: authoritative judgements that are 
capable of  easy interpretation and generating broad consensus. Balancers, more con-
fident in individual state discretion and inclined to protect it, view that institutional 
weakness as inevitable in this area, seeing decentralization as still capable of  nuanced 
and context-dependent assessment. Within that institutional context, flexible stan-
dards can generate enforcement pressures while also promoting adherence to legal 
analysis that guides deliberation.
5 Looking Forward and the Future of  Force Regulation
Now that the previous sections have shown that many debates about regulating resort 
to force reflect arguments and assumptions about doctrinal form as well as substance, 
this section looks forward to the future of  these debates and their normative implica-
tions. It argues that if  doctrinal structure and legal argumentation matter in ways 
besides reinforcing substantive policy agendas, new combinations of  legal form, sub-
stance, and institutions may be possible, and it recommends some further lines of  
inquiry for examining them.
A  Options for Legal Re-Form
Section 3 showed that the doctrinal preference for cabining force outside the UN 
Security Council process with either rules or standards correlates so highly with pref-
erence for very narrow versus more permissive licence that choice of  doctrinal form 
– rules or standards for defining those exceptional authorities – is almost never con-
sidered an independent variable. If  doctrinal form is separately meaningful in some of  
the ways discussed in section 4, however, then one might expect there to be more con-
sideration of  proposals that match strict constraints on force with standards or match 
looser constraints with rules. Why, in other words, is international legal discussion 
about force almost entirely restricted to only two diagonal quadrants in the matrix, 
above, of  Figure 1?
For example, if  Bright-Liners are correct that sharply-drawn, determinate, and uni-
versally authoritative rules promote enforcement, and if  Balancers are also correct 
that the UN Security Council process is ill-suited to deal with contemporary threats, 
why do we so rarely hear proposals to broaden states’ authority to use force outside 
the Security Council with a set of  codified rules that delineate additional exceptions 
to Article 51 from Article 2(4)? Imagine that in addition to a right of  self-defence in 
the event of  actual or temporally imminent attacks, states had a right to use force, 
say, against sites from which a defined category of  terrorist attacks were planned and 
logistically supported, or against nuclear weapons facilities of  those states who had 
been found by the UN Security Council to have violated their non-proliferation treaty 
obligations. A variant might codify some pre-determined exceptions to the use of  force 
that, while perhaps including some standard-like flexibility, would spell out more pre-
cisely in a series of  additional rules the specific categories of  threatening activities that 
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force authorized even without Security Council approval to neutralize terrorist groups 
operating on the territory of  other states when those other states fail to discharge spe-
cific international legal obligations to suppress them; to prevent a state from trans-
ferring WMD to terrorist groups; or by regional organizations to prevent genocide or 
other specifically-defined categories of  mass atrocities.134
If, on the other hand, Balancers are correct that objective criteria can effectively 
guide deliberation about force in ways that promote legal compliance and Bright-
Liners are also correct that broad authority to use force is destabilizing, why do we 
not see proposals to restrict tightly states’ authority to use force with very exacting 
standards that, while flexible and adaptable, are exceedingly difficult to meet? Imagine 
tightening the sort of  reasonable necessity analysis often used by powerful states and 
advocated by Balancers by requiring that assessments of  threats and necessity be 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ or something akin to that threshold. In the 1999 Kosovo 
crisis, for example, the United Kingdom articulated the view that military action with-
out UN Security Council authorization might be legal to prevent an ‘immediate and 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe’ – a standard which perhaps might be read 
to require a higher threshold of  magnitude and urgency than would most ‘reasonable 
necessity’ humanitarian intervention formulas.135
With regard to the first possibility, of  codifying more permissive rules, serious pro-
posals are almost non-existent, probably in part because amending the UN Charter or 
reaching UN Security Council agreement in advance on a set of  contingencies war-
ranting force would be practically impossible. Such ‘legislative’ processes require such 
a high degree of  consensus among states and all permanent members of  the Security 
Council (members of  which stand to lose power by diluting the Council’s authority) 
that they are effectively out of  reach136 – even more so if  there were a need period-
ically to update the rules to account for changing threats, technologies, and so on. In 
other words, an orientation among those who support broad state authority to use 
force toward Balancers’ flexible standards is heavily determined by an institutional 
context in which expanding the substantive scope of  rules is extremely difficult. It is 
likely, too, that even among academic Bright-Liners who may not be deterred by those 
practical or political constraints, the near absence of  proposals in this space comes 
back again not only to general policy preferences about military force but also more 
specific concerns that the enforcement and compliance advantages of  clear lines that 
Bright-Liners tout with respect to a narrow interpretation of  Article 51 might not be 
so effective were more and more exceptions to Article 2(4) added.
The second possibility, of  formulating more demanding standards, may be prom-
ising and warrants greater attention. Whereas codifying more permissive rules 
would probably require UN Charter amendment or legislation through the Security 
134 Similar UN Charter amendments were proposed by Richard N. Gardner, who argues that the US under 
President George W. Bush too easily manipulated flexible standards but that current bright-line excep-
tions to Art. 2(4) are too narrow: see Gardner, ‘Neither Bush nor the “Jurisprudes”’, 97 AJIL (2003) 585, 
at 590.
135 See Wood, supra note 48, at 82.
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Council, a process for promoting more constraining standards could at least be initi-
ated by state declarations and practice, whether unilaterally or through a group of  
like-minded states. If, as Balancers claim, flexible but objective standards can generate 
enforcement pressures, promote compliance pulls, and shape and guide deliberative 
processes within and among states, then those who view the substantive formulas 
applied by Balancers as too permissive should engage their content and criteria more 
vigorously and directly. Standards could be clarified to make them less open-ended and 
more informative to curb discretion.
This might include proposed legal formulas that narrow the types or magnitudes 
of  threats, elevate the standards of  certainty, or weight the proportionality require-
ments that go into a policy-appropriate legal balancing calculus.137 Anticipatory self-
defence against incipient nuclear threats, for example, might presumptively require 
at a minimum clear and convincing assessments as to that state’s will and capability 
to carry out threats, and that the danger of  waiting be vastly disproportionate to the 
anticipated harms of  the contemplated self-defensive force. Especially in an era of  stra-
tegic uncertainty, in which power relations and threats are shifting in ways difficult to 
predict, a flexible standard with high evidentiary burdens on states using force invites 
exploration of  potentially relevant contextual factors but conditions action on demon-
stration that those findings can withstand searching scrutiny internally and by other 
actors in the international system.
Besides highlighting the possibilities for recalibrating doctrinal form and policy 
substance, the analysis of  section 4 also casts additional light on some prominent 
structural reform proposals. Those proposals are usually considered in terms of  their 
institutional features or their substantive policy choices. They can also be understood, 
however, as efforts to make bright-line regimes more standard-like or to make balanc-
ing regimes more rule-like by ‘brightening’ their outcomes.
Moving from one end, some scholars have proposed mechanisms for subjecting 
forceful actions based on flexible standards to post hoc adjudicative processes. Michael 
Doyle, for example, urges that any proposed force beyond Bright-Liners’ rules should 
be brought to the Security Council, but if  the Security Council declines to act against 
threats, then in exceptional circumstances states should have discretion to act unilat-
erally. In such cases, the legitimacy of  states’ actions should be assessed by reference 
to the lethality of  the threat, the likelihood of  its materialization, the legitimacy of  
the proposed action (determined by reference to traditional just war principles), and 
the legality of  the target state’s behaviour and the threatened state’s response.138 If  
a state bypasses the Security Council in resorting to pre-emptive or preventive force, 
it also ought to submit a public report after the fact to the Security Council, which 
would then investigate and assess the justifiability of  the action subject to a majority 
vote without vetoes.139 This approach would permit discretion based on flexible but 
137 See Waxman, supra note 2, at 67–72 (arguing that advocates of  objective reasonableness standards for 
regulating force should examine more thoroughly issues of  proof  burdens).
138 See Doyle, supra note 30, at 46–62.
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objective standards (very similar to those generally pressed by other Balancers), and 
over time would generate a ‘common law’ of  precedent for guiding future actions. 
Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane propose several variant models for improving 
accountability for uses of  force, including Security Council-appointed impartial bodies 
to determine whether an intervener’s ex ante justification is confirmed ex post and to 
assess penalties for improper judgements, or the adoption of  such mechanisms by a 
separate coalition of  democratic states that would judge the legitimacy of  uses of  force 
outside the Security Council.140
These proposals share a goal not only of  creating a more policy-appropriate balance 
of  risk but also, through deliberative and adjudicative processes, of  exposing and sub-
jecting to external scrutiny the specific substantive strands of  use-of-force legal analy-
sis.141 In both cases the idea is to ‘brighten’ the outcome of  Balancers’ application of  
flexible standards through greater ex post crystallization of  propriety or impropriety 
judgements that command widespread, authoritative respect – and thereby captur-
ing some of  the enforcement and compliance advantages usually associated with 
bright-line rules.
Moving from the other end, some prominent international groupings have pro-
posed incorporating flexible but objective criteria used by Balancers more directly into 
‘bright’ UN Security Council processes, in ways that might gain some of  the virtues 
claimed by Balancers. The UN High-Level Panel recommended that the UN Security 
Council and General Assembly adopt a set of  principles – seriousness of  threat, proper 
purpose, last resort, proportionality, and balance of  consequences – to guide Security 
Council deliberations. In endorsing the Panel’s report, former UN Secretary General 
Kofi  Annan similarly recommended that, in considering whether to authorize force, 
the Security Council should ‘come to a common view on how to weigh’ these five 
factors.142 Structuring Security Council deliberations in this way would enhance 
decision-making transparency and facilitate analytical comparison across cases. The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a panel of  
respected international legal and diplomatic figures convened by the Canadian gov-
ernment following the 1999 Kosovo crisis, proposed that the UN General Assembly 
adopt a declaratory resolution calling for UN Security Council authorization of  
humanitarian intervention pursuant to a similar set of  informative standards: right 
authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable 
prospects of  success.143
Note that these factors are almost identical to those usually relied upon by Balancers 
– the difference lies in institutional structure for applying them. Such efforts seek to 
make collective decision-making processes more deliberatively principled through 
140 See Buchanan and Keohane, ‘The Preventive Use of  Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’, 18 
Ethics & Int’l Affairs (2004) 1.
141 See Doyle, supra note 30, at 33; Buchanan and Keohane, supra note 140, at 9.
142 Report of  the Secretary-General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Developments, Security and Human 
Rights for All’, UN Doc A/59/2005 (2005), available at: www.un.org/largerfreedom.
143 See The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect 
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objective criteria, thereby reclaiming some of  the advantages claimed by Balancers, 
that standards generate greater compliance and respect through the persuasiveness of  
argumentation and justification rather than relying on their ready conclusiveness.144
None of  these radical legal-structural reforms is remotely likely for the foreseeable 
future, because the costs of  formal restructuring of  the Charter system are too high, 
and the legal, political, and strategic divides among parties too great and complex.145 
That said, viewing them in this light helps in understanding more clearly the inter-
relationships of  form, substance, and institutional context – and the challenge of  
manipulating one without effects on the others. These possibilities also reinforce the 
earlier point that Bright-Liners’ and Balancers’ approaches are not dichotomous but 
are points along a spectrum between pure rules and standards, with many possible 
formulas in between.
B Threats of  Force and Doctrinal Form
One area where both Bright-Liners and Balancers fall short analytically concerns the 
regulation of  threats of  force, by which I broadly mean wielding inchoate force to deter 
or compel another state’s behaviour. Recall that Article 2(4) prohibits the ‘threat’ as 
well as ‘use’ of  force. However, legal doctrine is not well developed in this area beyond 
prohibiting the most blatantly aggressive threats,146 nor is the regulation of  threats 
of  force well theorized in legal scholarship by either Bright-Liners or Balancers147 
(though it is thoroughly theorized and researched in political science scholarship148).
The scarcity of  doctrinal development with respect to threatened force probably 
stems in part from measurement difficulties, since threatened force and its effects often 
involve unobservable factors (e.g., parties’ intentions, perceptions, and implicit signal-
ling). It also stems in part from the fact that threats of  force – especially implied threats 
– are ever-present features of  interstate diplomacy,149 and some level of  threatened 
force, especially as a deterrent, is necessary to maintain stability. Oscar Schachter spec-
ulated that Article 2(4) is so rarely invoked against implied threats because of  ‘the sub-
tleties of  power relations and the difficulty of  demonstrating coercive intent’ as well as 
‘the general recognition of  and tolerance for disparities of  power and of  their effect in 
maintaining the dominant and subordinate relationships between unequal states’.150 
The scarcity of  legal scholarship, unlike political science, with respect to threatened 
force probably stems in part from methodological orientation, too. Lawyers study 
precedent, and to do so they train to analyse ‘cases’, or past fact patterns matched with 
144 See Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of  the Better Argument’, 14 EJIL (2003) 437, 
at 480.
145 See Murphy, supra note 15, at 42.
146 See Sadurska, ‘Threats of  Force’, 82 AJIL (1988) 239.
147 See Roscini, ‘Threats of  Armed Force and Contemporary International Law’ [2007] Netherlands Int’l L 
Rev 229, at 231–232 (discussing the dearth of  such scholarship).
148 See D. Byman and M. Waxman, The Dynamics of  Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of  Military 
Might (2002), at 3–18 (surveying scholarship).
149 See ibid., at 32–33.
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legal outcomes. Such an approach tends to neglect or undercount the most common 
ways in which force is used: to coerce or deter behaviour without, optimally, having 
actually to use any of  it – the better it works, the less observable ‘case’ there is to study.
A related problem with so much study of  law regulating force is that it is unilateral 
in perspective. It focuses on how law regulating force might affect State A’s decision-
making whether to use force against State B, without focusing on how State B’s behav-
iour and decision-making might, in turn, also be shaped by that legal regime. To the 
extent that law affects State A’s decision-making about force, though, it also affects 
State B’s perceptions and discounting of  costs and benefits associated with its own 
actions – in particular, the risk of  threatened force by State A it incurs by its actions.
If  one thinks about the major legal debates about resort to force in the usual sub-
stantive terms – strict limits versus permissive flexibility – an agenda for further study 
of  threats might feature such questions as: on the one hand, to what extent do more 
permissive standards regulating force help to deter hostile behaviour – such as devel-
oping offensive WMD programmes, conducting systemic atrocities, or harbouring ter-
rorist groups – by lowering the barriers to combating those threats with force? On 
the other hand, to what extent does greater permissiveness to use force spur some 
of  those very threats, perhaps by causing smaller powers to develop WMD or ties to 
terrorist groups as their own deterrents? In other words, if  the legal debates about 
resort to force are framed in terms of  managing competing risks of  allowing too much 
aggressive force versus over-constraining defensive force against threats, key policy 
questions centre on how effectively a given level of  permissiveness to use force affects 
some states’ ability credibly to threaten it and, in turn, other states’ risk assessments 
of  various courses of  action.151
Analysis of  legal-doctrinal form points to additional avenues of  inquiry, though: 
perhaps whether legal prohibitions and authorities are structured as bright-line rules 
and processes versus flexible standards also shapes perceptions about threatened 
force. In addition to the constraining influence, what effects, one might ask, does the 
choice between Bright-Liners’ and Balancers’ doctrinal formulas for regulating force 
by State A have on State B’s threat perceptions, especially if  a policy goal is to deter cer-
tain hostile conduct (again, say developing offensive WMD programmes, perpetrating 
atrocities, or harbouring terrorist groups)?
In one of  the most important theoretical works of  the last century on the strategy 
of  threats, Thomas Schelling posited the importance of  ‘focal points’ – ‘each [side’s] 
expectation of  what the other expects [it] to expect to be expected to do’ – to interna-
tional negotiations in the shadow of  threats.152 Building on Schelling’s work, Alexander 
George and William Simon’s influential empirical work on the strategy of  threatened 
force concludes that clarity of  objectives and terms of  settlement are im portant posi-
tive factors in successful coercive diplomacy, or diplomacy backed by threats including 
151 These issues amid the contemporary international security environment are widely debated in the politi-
cal science and strategic studies literature: see, e.g., Litwak, ‘Regime Change 2.0’, 32 Wilson Q (Autumn 
2008) 22; Moran, ‘Review: Beyond Deterrence’, 7 Int’l Studies Rev (2005) 285; Nichols, ‘Anarchy and 
Order in the New Age of  Prevention’, 22 World Policy J (Autumn 2005) 1.
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force.153 Perhaps the clear lines and processes favoured by Bright-Liners – to the extent 
that their substantive contours match critical, desired policy outcomes – can bolster 
the effectiveness of  coercive diplomacy or help to prevent unwarranted escalation by 
clarifying the conditions under which force would or would not be used. At least with 
respect to self-defence exceptions to the Charter’s prohibition on force or demands set 
out in UN Security Council resolutions authorizing force, the same clarity that Bright-
Liners insist upon to enhance enforcement and compliance with jus as bellum norms 
might also help to resolve ambiguity as to terms for peaceful settlement or continued 
diplomacy.
Alternatively, perhaps Balancers’ approaches allow for more strategic ambiguity 
and greater flexibility to mix carrots and sticks in ways important to coercive diplo-
macy. It might be argued that Bright-Liners’ approaches to doctrinal form undermine 
deterrent threats because bright-line rules, accompanied by slow UN Security Council 
process, allow bad actors to operate right up to a clear line without fear of  force.154 The 
clarity of  rules that Bright-Liners seek to harness in enforcing compliance puts both 
sides on notice of  the precise conditions precedent to legal force (whether UN Security 
Council authorization or the crossing of  the bright-line self-defence triggers), but 
those actors posing the menace have other strong informational advantages, includ-
ing about their next moves and the truth or falsity of  their claims. That is, under a 
Bright-Line regime, those who perpetrate menaces can plan their actions with a good 
deal of  legal certainty about what will or will not be likely to trigger forceful responses 
(especially given that the Security Council tends to move very incrementally towards 
authorizing force), while those seeking to combat those dangers through calibrated 
strategies of  coercion and deterrence must do so under significant uncertainty as 
to whether and when force might be authorized, thereby providing menacers with 
opportunities to play the system.155
As to future research, if  doctrinal form is important to setting policy balances of  
force and restraint as well as to promoting enforcement pressures and compliance 
pulls of  the UN Charter regime, then legal scholars should widen their lens to include 
its effects on threatened force, including subtle and tacit threats. In considering both 
the substance and form of  legal regimes, scholars should take into account that threat-
ened or inchoate force affects the course of  events, the moves and counter-moves by 
multiple actors, and states’ trust in collective security arrangements long before crises 
materialize as ‘cases’.
153 See George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, in A.L. George and W.E. Simons (eds), The Limits of  
Coercive Diplomacy (2nd edn, 1994), at 267, 280, 286.
154 In his seminal article on rules v. standards in private law, Duncan Kennedy argues that a problem with 
bright-line rules is that the unscrupulous actor can go right up to them – that they signal to actors exactly 
how far they can operate without negative legal repercussion, and therefore encourage them to push to 
that boundary: see Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1742–1745, 1773–1774.
155 For a discussion of  this phenomenon in the context of  mass atrocities see Genocide Prevention Task 
Force, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers (2008), at 69. For a discussion in the context 
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C Doctrinal Form and Future Institutional Context: Jus ad Bellum 
and Beyond
This article started with an observation that any meaningful discussion of  legal doc-
trinal form takes place within an institutional context, in this area one that is largely 
decentralized and heavily reliant on individual states for legal application and enforce-
ment. Recall, too, that it was only with the end of  the Cold War – and the emancipa-
tion of  the UN Security Council from paralysis – that Bright-Liners could advocate a 
serious case based on collective security decision-making. This article then proceeded 
to analyse the debate about doctrinal rules or standards for regulating force as though 
that institutional context is fixed.
Looking over the horizon, however, there are alternative institutional futures – as well 
as changes in global power politics156 – that could again drive changes in doctrinal form, 
or at least shuffle the matrix of  virtues and drawbacks of  rigid rules or flexible standards:
•	 The UN Security Council’s authority could one day erode, especially if  its compo-
sition remains fixed to outdated distributions of  state power or it fails to meet ade-
quately emerging security and humanitarian challenges.157 This would weaken 
Bright-Liners’ argument that the Charter’s collective security arrangements are 
adequate to deal with many threats, but if  it means devolving more discretion to 
individual states it could also amplify calls to contain that discretion with clear rules.
•	 The Security Council’s authority might be challenged increasingly in the future 
by regional bodies, such as NATO or the African Union, or by new blocs of  states 
tied together by ideology, such as a concert of  democracies, whose pronounce-
ments on the legality of  force might be given great weight among international 
audiences.158 On the one hand, regionalism or the rise of  other blocs might pro-
vide a way to break the legislative deadlock of  UN Charter reform, offering a route 
to expand rule-bound exceptions to prohibited force. On the other hand, it would 
promote alternative multilateral venues capable of  applying flexible standards.
•	 Non-state actors, including NGOs and expert groups, might gain an increasingly 
influential voice in this arena, as they have in other areas of  international law. 
Their efforts could galvanize public opinion with respect to the legality of  force, 
thereby diminishing the power of  states but in some cases providing influential 
judgements in applying flexible standards.159 Consider, for example, the influence 
of  ICISS and the International Independent Commission on Kosovo in shaping 
international opinion that the 1999 Kosovo intervention was legitimate.160
156 An obvious example is a rising and increasingly militarily powerful China.
157 See Thakur, ‘Law, Legitimacy and United Nations’, 11 Melbourne J Int’l L (2010) 1, at 18; see also Caron, 
supra note 9, at 562–566 (discussing challenges to the SC’s authority).
158 See Franck, supra note 39, at 100 (regional bodies); Princeton Project on National Security, Forging a 
World of  Liberty Under Law (2006), at 25–26 (concert of  democracies).
159 Some argue that this is already the case: see, e.g., I. Johnstone, The Power of  Deliberation: International Law, 
Politics and Organizations (2011), at 60–63 (arguing that non-governmental actors play a strong role in 
UN SC deliberative processes).
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•	 The United States and some other powerful states opposed expanding the ICC’s 
jurisdiction to include aggression crimes, and the ICC is unlikely to emerge as a 
major actor in this field (in part because it has proven so difficult to negotiate clear 
rules to define offences).161 Ironically, though, a powerful, supranational judicial 
arbiter of  the legality of  force might help to answer arguments against the flex-
ible standards approach advocated by Balancers and generally employed by the 
United States, because it could provide centralized, formal judgements and its 
authority might counter Bright-Liners’ worry that flexible standards are uncon-
trollable in the hands of  individual states.
These are just several among the many possible institutional dimensions that could 
feed back into future debates about doctrinal form.
Law regarding resort to force is unique in many respects, among them its implica-
tion of  the most vital state interests, including sometimes state survival; its peculiar 
institutional context, pairing the centralized and formalized UN Security Council sys-
tem with a heavy reliance on decentralized legal interpretation and enforcement; and 
its (fortunately) relatively infrequent application. However, some of  the sub-debates 
between Bright-Liners and Balancers may be generalizable or trans-substantive, such 
as the extent to which the clarity of  rules or the persuasiveness of  standards is likely 
to promote compliance.162 Some broad issues from above, such as the need to consider 
doctrinal form in the context of  institutional mechanisms for applying it and enforc-
ing it, are of  course relevant across other areas of  international law.
Some scholars have observed, in that regard, that the choice of  rules or standards in 
international law is likely to depend on the ‘thickness’ of  institutional context, includ-
ing the availability of  judicial or administrative authorities,163 though they draw a wide 
range of  conclusions as to which ways greater institutionalization cuts regarding the 
precision of  rules or vagueness of  standards.164 One might expect, for example, that the 
development and institutionalization of  World Trade Organization dispute resolution 
mechanisms would affect design choices of  legal rules versus standards with regard 
to trade law, another area of  international cooperation, competition, and conflict.165
161 See V. Padmanabhan, From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the 2010 International Criminal Court 
Review Conference (2010), at 12–17.
162 More common than scholarly discussion of  doctrinal form is discussion of  legal ‘precision’ and compli-
ance with international law. See, e.g., Goodman and Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law’, 54 Duke LJ (2004) 621, at 675–687 (discussing theories of  precision 
and compliance in the context of  human rights law).
163 See Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of  Legalization’, 54 Int’l Org (2000) 401, at 413–414.
164 See Finnemore and Toope, ‘Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of  Law and Politics’, 55 Int’l Org 
(2001) 743, at 747–750.
165 See Trachtman, ‘The Domain of  WTO Dispute Resolution’, 40 Harvard Int’l LJ (1999) 333, at 350–375; 
see also Abbott et al., supra note 3, at 414 n.34 (‘agreements administered by the WTO can, with simi-
lar legitimacy and effectiveness, specify detailed rules on the valuation of  imports for customs purposes 
and rely on broad standards like “national treatment”’). For a similar discussion of  rules v.  standards 
in the international investment treaty context see Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty 
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Section 4’s mapping of  assumptions about doctrinal form and legal enforcement 
and compliance then raises broader lines of  inquiry about international regulation. 
Future analysis should look across areas of  international law for evidence about the 
way legal-doctrinal form affects state decision-making or appraisal processes. It should 
also ask to what degree is choice of  doctrinal form in the use of  force arena especially 
necessary to account for the unique features of  decision-making about security and 
the distinctive institutional context in which it takes place.
6 Conclusion
Most debate about regulating resort to force focuses on substantive questions, includ-
ing how tightly or loosely to regulate force and what types of  contingencies or threats 
should give rise to legal force options outside the collective decision-making process of  
the UN Security Council. These debates can also be recast in terms of  doctrinal form, 
and doing so exposes how many of  the assumptions about balancing substantive pol-
icy goals and risks are usually coupled with other important and divergent assump-
tions about the way international law operates in this field. In seeking to understand 
the roles doctrinal form and legal argumentation play besides setting substantive pol-
icy balances, this analysis helps in understanding the merits and limits of  UN Charter 
regime reform proposals – including options obscured by the usual framing of  debate 
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